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ABSTRACT
In this Article, we revisit the clash between private law and the First
Amendment in the Supreme Court’s recent case, Snyder v. Phelps,
using a private-law lens. We are scholars who write about private law
as individual justice, a perspective that has been lost in recent years
but is currently enjoying something of a revival.
Our argument is that the Supreme Court’s theory of private law
has led it down a path that has distorted its doctrine in several areas,
including the First Amendment–tort clash in Snyder. In areas that
range from punitive damages to preemption, the Supreme Court has
adopted a particular and dominant, but highly contested, theory of
private law. It is the theory that private law is not private at all; it is
part and parcel of government regulation, or “public law in disguise.”
Part I is a brief overview of how that jurisprudential view came to
be, as well as a sketch of a competing view of private law as individual
justice. In Part II, we briefly trace the development of the doctrine
surrounding the tension between the First Amendment and private
law, particularly tort law, and how it helps lead to the view of private
law as government regulation displayed in Snyder. We also point out
how the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort, the main
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claim at issue in Snyder, is a particularly poor vehicle for the Court’s
theory of private law. A relatively recent tort, it was developed by
scholars and judges as a means of redress for plaintiffs who had been
wronged, but were left without a remedy.
Part III presents the central claims of the Article. We argue that the
conception of private law as government regulation in Snyder arises
from a combination of (1) the doctrinal tools that judges use in First
Amendment cases, (2) the unitary nature of the state-action doctrine,
and (3) the influence of instrumentalism, specifically in obscuring the
plaintiff’s agency and the state interest in redress, and in privileging a
particular view of compensation. In Part IV, we present some
normative or prescriptive implications of our analysis, and then
conclude.
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INTRODUCTION
1

Snyder v. Phelps was the blockbuster case of the Supreme
Court’s October 2010 Term, and for good reason. It had vivid facts:
the father of a slain Marine sued protesters from a church whose
mission was to disrupt funerals of soldiers around the country in
2
order to spread their message of the dangers of homosexuality. It
featured the sexiest amendment in the Bill of Rights—the First—and
perhaps the central principle in American political culture: freedom of
speech. But with all of the First Amendment hype, less noticed was
the underlying nature of the lawsuit itself, which had nothing to do
with freedom of speech. It was the kind of lawsuit brought every day
in courts around the country: a private party files a complaint,
demands an answer, and alleges that the defendant has wronged him.
When the case went to trial, the particular claims that went to the
jury were for intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion
3
of privacy: common-law torts. Snyder was, fundamentally, about
private law. And it wasn’t just media coverage and commentators that
missed this point: the Supreme Court itself failed to appreciate the
private-law nature of the case.
In this Article, we approach the tension in Snyder between
private law and the First Amendment through the lens of private law
4
as individual justice. When invoking the term “private law,” we do
not mean to suggest that certain areas of law are pre-political, or exist
somehow apart from the state. We simply mean to refer to commonlaw subjects like torts, contract, and property (and their statutory
counterparts) that involve primary rights by individuals that can be

1. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
2. Id. at 1213.
3. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 570 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir.
2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011). A claim of civil conspiracy—based on the two tort claims—
also went to the jury. Id.
4. See generally, e.g., Nathan B. Oman, The Honor of Private Law, 80 FORDHAM L. REV.
31 (2011); Jason M. Solomon, Equal Accountability Through Tort Law, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1765
(2009) [hereinafter Solomon, Equal Accountability]; Jason M. Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs, 60
VAND. L. REV. 1749 (2007) [hereinafter Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs].
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enforced by the rights-holders themselves against other individuals
5
and entities.
We argue that the Supreme Court’s theory of private law—one
that follows the dominant view of private law as a species of
government regulation—has distorted its decisions in several areas,
including the First Amendment–tort clash in Snyder.
Much of the Court’s approach to “speech torts” like defamation,
invasion of privacy, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress
tort at issue in Snyder can be explained by the particular
circumstances in which the Court has interpreted the First
Amendment in modern cases. Before New York Times Co. v.
6
Sullivan in 1964, the Supreme Court had not applied the First
7
Amendment to state common-law actions. But Sullivan was a
uniquely appropriate vehicle for doing so. After all, cases in which
government officials seek to suppress criticism lie at the core of
8
virtually any theory of free speech. In Sullivan, as we discuss, this is
clearly what the ostensibly private lawsuit was intended to do.
From the inception of the tort-versus-First Amendment doctrine,
therefore, the Court treated private law as a tool used by government
9
to suppress and punish speech. The fact that the cases decided
immediately after Sullivan involved public figures surely contributed
10
to this trend. By the time the Court decided Snyder, nearly fifty
years later, the assumption that tort law served to suppress speech
had become so pervasive that it scarcely needed to be articulated, and
even an action by a private individual who was in no sense a

5. See John C.P. Goldberg, Symposium, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law, 125
HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (2012) (referring to private law as that which “defines the rights and
duties of individuals and private entities as they relate to one another”).
6. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
7. Id. at 299–300 & n.3 (Goldberg, J., concurring in the result) (pointing out that the
Court was “writing upon a clean slate”). But see Eugene Volokh, Tort Liability and the Original
Meaning of the Freedom of Speech, Press, and Petition, 96 IOWA L. REV. 249, 250 (2010)
(arguing that “constitutional constraints on speech-based civil liability have deep roots”).
8. See Frederick Schauer, Facts and the First Amendment, 57 UCLA L. REV. 897, 918
(2010) (noting that the First Amendment was “designed to serve a quite limited purpose in
preventing government suppression” of speech).
9. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (“Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts,
breach of the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for
the repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that
satisfy the First Amendment.” (footnotes omitted)).
10. See, e.g., Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383
U.S. 75, 77 (1966).
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government official or public figure was conceptualized as an
attempt to suppress offensive speech rather than an action seeking
12
private redress.
To understand why the Supreme Court currently holds this view
of private law as a form of state regulation, it is necessary to look
beyond the development of First Amendment doctrine. A widely held
view of private law that has taken hold during the course of the
twentieth century has influenced the Court’s approach to tort law.
What follows in Part I is a brief overview of how that view came to
be, as well as a sketch of a competing view.
In Part II, we briefly trace the doctrine navigating the tension
between the First Amendment and tort law, showing how the Court’s
decisions have led to the view of private law as government
regulation displayed in Snyder. We also point out how the intentional
infliction of emotional distress tort, the main claim at issue in Snyder,
is a particularly odd vehicle for the Court’s theory of private law. The
tort was developed by scholars and judges as a means of redress for
plaintiffs who had been wronged, but were left without a remedy.
Seen in this context, intentional infliction and Snyder fall squarely in
the wrongs-and-redress conception of private law.
Part III presents the central claims of the Article. We argue that
the conception of private law as government regulation in Snyder
arises from a combination of (1) the doctrinal tools that judges use in
First Amendment cases, (2) the unitary nature of the state-action
doctrine, and (3) the influence of instrumentalism, specifically in
obscuring the plaintiff’s agency and the state interest in redress, and
13
in privileging a particular view of compensation. In Part IV, we

11. Doctrinally the Supreme Court treats public figures and government officials the same
in the context of defamation. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974) (“[T]he
communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public officials and public
figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of injury from defamatory
falsehood concerning them. . . . [P]rivate individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than
public officials and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery.”).
12. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (arguing that the outrageousness
standard for speech in the intentional infliction of emotional distress tort carries a high risk that
the jury will become an instrument for “suppression of . . . expression” (quoting Bose Corp. v.
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
13. Benjamin Zipursky has pointed to this last factor as one that has led the Supreme
Court astray in the areas of punitive damages and preemption. See Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Palsgraf, Punitive Damages, and Preemption, 125 Harvard Law Review 1757, 1760, 1770–71
(2012) (arguing that “[i]f scholars, lawyers, or judges insist on treating the common law of torts
as simply a form of public law that delegates enforcement to individual plaintiffs, they will be
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present some normative implications of our analysis. First, we
conclude that—in a way that it did not in Snyder—the Court should
find ways of protecting First Amendment values by containing the
right to civil recourse rather than cutting it off altogether. Second, the
Court should be more attentive to the nature of state involvement in
litigation and the importance of the state’s interest in providing
private parties with a means of redress for private injuries. Finally,
the Court should pay more attention to the identity of the plaintiff
and the way that the litigation is being used. There is a difference
between a government official seeking to quash criticism and a
private individual seeking redress for a wrong in which he was
uniquely victimized.
I. COMPETING THEORIES OF PRIVATE LAW
A. Private Law as Government Regulation
Modern thinking about private law began on January 8, 1897.
Picking such dates is always arbitrary, of course, but this day’s claim is
at least as good as any other. On that date, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. gave a lecture at Boston University Law School, later published in
14
the nascent Harvard Law Review as “The Path of the Law.”
Holmes’s lecture came at a moment of tremendous creativity in
private law. The decades after the Civil War saw the common law
transformed by two pressures, one internal and one external. The
internal pressure was the final collapse of the common-law writ
15
system. As the old writs lost their grip on procedure and with it legal
thought, it became necessary for judges and commentators to
construct, for the first time, general bodies of doctrine governing tort
and contract. This resulted in a huge burst of legal creativity as whole
16
areas of the law were reimagined for the post-writ universe.
The external pressure came from the massive economic and
industrial expansion witnessed in the United States in the years after

doing torts with their eyes shut and stumbling at every turn,” and pointing to punitive damages
and preemption as areas where the Supreme Court has made this mistake).
14. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897).
15. See G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 8–12
(1980) (describing the collapse of the writ system).
16. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 335 (2d ed. 1985) (“It
is not hard to argue that American law between 1850 and 1900 underwent revolutionary
change.”).
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the Civil War. In part this was technological. Improvements in the
18
efficiency of steam engines dropped freight costs by sea and by rail.
Instant, long-distance communication became widely available via
telegraph and then telephone. Industrialization, especially increased
mechanization, dramatically decreased production costs, creating the
first truly national and international markets for manufactured goods,
19
especially consumer goods. All of these economic developments, in
turn, required private law to grapple with whole new categories of
disputes, such as industrial accidents and complex corporate
20
contracts.
Holmes thus wrote at a moment when private law in the United
States was in profound doctrinal and intellectual upheaval, adapting
itself to a radically new environment. In this context, Holmes
provided a bracing new vision of the law, one based on a hardheaded
21
functionalism and a strong distaste for moralizing jurisprudence.
Rather than understanding the law in terms of some internal logic or
the underlying structure of moral obligations, Holmes insisted on
22
viewing the law purely in terms of a system of incentives.
This emphasis on law’s functional reality, in turn, required that
one think of law in terms of social aggregates and public policies.
Having banished the language of morality from the law as so much
sentimentality, Holmes offered a vision in which legal outcomes were

17. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION:
ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETHCENTURY AMERICA 11 (2000) (alluding to the “rapid and tumultuous changes” during the late
nineteenth century that resulted in the transformation of the United States from a “rural,
agricultural, and decentralized society into an urbanized and industrialized nation in the process
of centralizing”).
18. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW 1 (2001) (noting that the
“sweeping changes in American economic life” were driven by “developments in the field of
transportation”).
19. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Design of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1544 (1973) (discussing the
“rapid growth of technology in consumer products” that led to the first set of tort claims
involving such products at the beginning of the twentieth century).
20. See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW,
1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY (1992).
21. See Holmes, supra note 14, at 461 (“It does not matter . . . whether the act to which it is
attached is described in terms of praise or in terms of blame, or whether the law purports to
prohibit it or to allow it.”).
22. See id. at 459 (“If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such knowledge enables him to
predict . . . .”).
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to be justified purely in terms of social utility. On this point it is
striking that Holmes, surely one of the most sophisticated legal
thinkers of his time, turned away from the most complex body of
interdisciplinary work on law at the close of the nineteenth century,
namely history. “It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
24
law than so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV,” he wrote.
History, Holmes conceded, is necessary to expose the reality of law.
However, he went on:
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in
the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is
his strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next is
either to kill him, or to tame him and make him a useful animal. For
the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of
the present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the
25
master of economics.

In short, according to Holmes, private law should be divorced from
noninstrumentalist moral philosophy, studied as a mechanism for
social control through incentives and organized to advance particular
26
social goods.
The century of private-law thinking since the publication of “The
Path of the Law” can be usefully understood as an attempt to tame
the dragon exposed by Holmes—the unruly historical accident that is
the common law—and render the dragon useful. Above all else,
27
usefulness has been understood in terms of enlightened regulation.
Writing a generation after Holmes, for example, Felix Cohen, a
leading legal realist, dismissed traditional legal reasoning as so much

23. See id. at 467 (“I think that the judges themselves have failed adequately to recognize
their duty of weighing considerations of social advantage.”).
24. Id. at 469.
25. Id.
26. See WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 23 (1996) (describing the instrumentalist perspective as
emphasizing “private law’s reflexive qualities as a mirror and facilitator of basic social processes,
most importantly capitalist development”).
27. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis,
Legal Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 167 (2006)
(defining the “instrumentalist thesis” as “the proposition that the outputs of legal decisionmaking processes (paradigmatically, appellate adjudication) are, and should be, determined by
extralegal considerations—that is, by (extralegal) considerations of policy or principle”
(emphasis omitted) (footnote omitted)).
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Legal realists like Cohen were
“transcendental nonsense.”
profoundly skeptical of the reasons traditionally given by commonlaw judges in support of their decisions and, like Holmes, longed for a
legal discourse that would focus on the public policies at stake rather
than obfuscating issues with the language of legal doctrine or
29
individual moral responsibility.
Although private-law scholarship has fractured in many
directions since the time of the legal realists, by and large it has
accepted the realists’ basic rules of discussion. Rather than looking to
the structure of legal doctrine for normative inspiration, the theorist
30
should treat judicial rhetoric with suspicion. The virtuous judge is
one who refuses to hide behind legal rules and forthrightly takes
31
policy choices and consequences into account. Private law in
particular should not be understood as resolving private disputes but
32
rather as a mechanism for public regulation. To be sure, there has
been a range of opinions as to what constitutes desirable public

28. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 809, 811 (1935). The attempt to understand legal arguments in terms of the structure of
legal concepts and their underlying normative logic, he insisted, was the equivalent of engaging
in a meaningless scholastic debate over how many angels can dance on the head of a pin. Id. at
810. The panacea to our jurisprudential ills, Cohen insisted, was “the functional approach.” Id.
at 822. Legal doctrine should be specified in terms of social aggregates and the effect of legal
rules on social outcomes. See id. at 812 (“[S]ocial forces . . . mold the law and the social ideals by
which the law is to be judged.”).
29. The work of the prominent legal-realist tort scholar Leon Green is a good example of
this. Green’s torts casebook took a functional approach to considering the implications of
various doctrinal choices for public policy. See WHITE, supra note 15, at 77 (discussing LEON
GREEN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN TORTS CASES (1931)).
30. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431, 450 (1930) (suggesting that “one lifts an eye canny and skeptical as to whether judicial
behavior is in fact what the . . . rule purports (implicitly) to state”); see also Thomas C. Grey,
Judicial Review and Legal Pragmatism, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 473, 476 (2003) (“[Reformist
American legal thinkers] created a single impressive and threatening bogeyman, Holmes’s
fallacy of logical formalism, Pound’s ‘mechanical jurisprudence,’ Cardozo’s ‘demon of
formalism,’ and Felix Cohen’s ‘transcendental nonsense.’” (citations omitted) (quoting Roscoe
Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 passim (1908); BENJAMIN N.
CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 66 (1921); and Cohen, supra note 28,
passim)).
31. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE OF
LAW 231 (2006) (associating this view of judging with both pragmatists like Judge Richard
Posner and purposivists like Justice Stephen Breyer).
32. See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 391 (1995) (“‘The final cause of
law’ . . . is the welfare of society.’ . . . Legal rules should be viewed in instrumental terms.”
(quoting CARDOZO, supra note 30, at 66)) (internal quotation mark omitted).
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regulation, but all sides have agreed that this is what private-law
33
categories such as tort and contract are doing.
On this view, tort law should be seen in terms of safety
regulation and social insurance. A primary purpose of making
tortfeasors liable is to police their conduct by imposing fines on
34
certain undesirable activities. The modern law-and-economics
movement has pursued this basic approach with the greatest tenacity
and rigor. Money damages, on this view, force actors to fully
internalize the cost of their own decisions, pushing them toward
35
optimal levels of investment in precautions and the like. Even those
who have not adopted the law-and-economics framework continue to
see tort law in terms of shifting losses from plaintiffs to defendants in
order to achieve distributionally desirable outcomes by, for example,
36
transforming corporate actors into insurers for those that they harm.
In either case, the law is a way of regulating conduct so as to achieve
particular social outcomes.
In short, despite the diversity of modern thinking on torts and
contracts, virtually all commentators assume that private law is a form
37
of public regulation. Writing more than one thousand years ago,
38
Tribonian opened the Institutes by writing, “There are two aspects of
the subject: public and private. Public law is concerned with the
organization of the Roman state, while private law is about the well39
being of individuals.” For much of Western legal history this
40
distinction was taken as basic. The century of legal thought since
Holmes, however, has made the distinction invisible if not

33. See, e.g., id. at 109–44; Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 passim (1976).
34. See LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 86 (2002)
(describing this as one way tort liability may affect well-being under a welfare-economics
framework).
35. For the leading account of this view, see generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970).
36. See Gregory C. Keating, Distributive and Corrective Justice in the Tort Law of
Accidents, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 193, 219 (2000).
37. See TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 132 (“All [legal academics] construe law in
fundamentally instrumental terms.”).
38. J. INST. (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod trans., Cornell Univ. Press 1987) (533).
39. Id. at 1.1.4.
40. See, e.g., HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION, II: THE IMPACT OF THE
PROTESTANT REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 99 (2003) (noting “the
massive classification and systematization of the rules of public and private law” in the wake of
the Lutheran reformation).
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incomprehensible. From Holmes’s “bad man” to the complex
theories of incentives promulgated by the economically inspired
thinking that dominates contemporary views about torts, private law
is something that the state does to its citizens. It is ultimately
regulatory in precisely the same way that Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) regulations or Federal Trade
42
Commission (FTC) rules are regulatory.
B. Private Law as Individual Justice
In opposition to the instrumentalist paradigm of private law, an
alternative view has arisen in the past few decades. It is a view that
might be described as old-fashioned, though it prevailed before
43
Holmesian thinking took over. It holds that private law is about
individual justice. The rise of this view results from several trends.
The first is a reaction to the dominance of instrumentalism in legal
reasoning and legal theory, particularly utilitarianism and its main
44
variant, law and economics. A second and related trend is the revival
of formalism, or “neoformalism,” as a legitimate and desirable way of
45
thinking about legal reasoning. A third trend is a revival of what

41. See Duncan Kennedy, comment, The Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private
Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1357 (1982) (arguing that one cannot take the “distinction
seriously as a description, as an explanation, or as a justification of anything”); Gary Peller &
Mark Tushnet, State Action and a New Birth of Freedom, 92 GEO. L.J. 779, 789 (2004) (stating
the realist view that the public-private distinction was conceptually impossible, given the fact
that “private” rights inevitably depend on the existence of state power to enforce them). But see
Goldberg, Pragmatism and Private Law, supra note 5, at 1640–41 (resisting the idea that “all law
is public law”); Christian Turner, Law’s Public/Private Structure, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1003,
1008 (2012) (arguing that the distinction “provides a lens into the fundamental structure of legal
culture,” and that a two-stage taxonomy mapping the public-private nature of law creation and
prosecution describes some of the fundamental choices for any legal system).
42. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV.
1625, 1641 (2002) (“[O]n the deterrence view, safety regulations issued by agencies such as
OSHA or [the Environmental Protection Agency] are even closer relatives to tort than criminal
laws: They set standards, backed by fines or other sanctions that, in theory, will deter socially
undesirable conduct.”).
43. Solomon, Equal Accountability, supra note 4, at 1772.
44. See TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 1 (“An instrumental view of law—the idea that law
is a means to an end—is taken for granted in the United States, almost a part of the air we
breathe.”); see also supra note 26.
45. For a good overview of the “new formalism” or “neoformalism,” see Symposium,
Formalism Revisited, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 527 (1999).
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some have called “rights talk” in the legal academy and in legal
46
practice. We briefly review each of these developments in turn.
The rise of instrumentalism occurred over time, but by the 1960s
47
and 1970s, its dominance in legal thinking was complete. It is not just
that it was unfashionable to think about law in any other way. It was
nearly impossible to be taken as a serious practitioner or academic
48
when articulating a different view. Such complete paradigm shifts, as
Thomas Kuhn and others have explained, inevitably lead to reactions
49
and swings in the other direction.
Eventually, however, legal scholars from different vantages
50
began to criticize instrumentalist thinking. Some of this movement
came from those trained in philosophy, where a similar reaction to
51
utilitarianism was taking place. Legal thinkers on the left thought
that instrumentalist thinking, particularly in the hands of economists,
46. For a critique from the academy, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE
IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 1–17 (1991) (taking stock of and critiquing this
revival of “rights talk”). For an exposition and defense from leading judges, see generally
Aharon Barak, Foreword, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy,
116 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2002); and William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433 (1986). These judicial accounts are cited in
Grey, supra note 30, at 480 n.24.
47. See TAMANAHA, supra note 31, at 116 (concluding that by the 1970s, “[t]he view that
law is in essence an instrument had won over the legal academy”); see also Solomon, Judging
Plaintiffs, supra note 4, at 1754–55 (“Since the publication of Oliver Wendell Holmes’ The
Common Law in 1881, the dominant perspective among scholars is that tort law can be justified
on instrumental grounds . . . .” (citation omitted)).
48. See Solum, supra note 27, at 167 (“Contemporary American legal thought accepted as
an almost dogmatic truth that legal decisions are (and should be) made on instrumental
grounds—shaping outcomes to serve normative concerns.”).
49. See Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639, 679–
81 (1990) (outlining four indicia that law is in a state of “Kuhnian crisis,” the fourth being “the
proliferation of ‘schools’ or ‘movements’ within the academy that increasingly talk past one
another: law and economics, law and literature, conventionalism, originalism, feminism, critical
legal studies”).
50. For an example of such criticism in torts scholarship, see John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1733, 1735–45 (1998),
which argues for a reintroduction in legal thinking of duty concepts, alongside instrumentalist
concerns.
51. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 232–38 (1977) (arguing that
utilitarianism fails to provide equality); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 14, 26–27, 286–89
(1971) (arguing that utilitarianism cannot give voice to concerns of fairness and individuality);
Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 50, at 1804 (“Although it continues to enjoy considerable
popularity, utilitarianism was the subject of severe philosophical critique in the 1950s, ‘60s, and
‘70s.”); Bernard Williams, A Critique of Utilitarianism, in J.J.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS,
UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 75, 93–118 (1973) (arguing that utilitarianism renders
moral values unintelligible). See generally UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND (Amartya Sen &
Bernard Williams eds., 1982) (critiquing various forms of utilitarian thought).
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failed to consider important factors such as fairness and social
52
solidarity in assessing the impact of law. Still others worried that if
law simply collapsed into public policy, then law would lose its
53
essential character. Scholars and judges on the right thought that
instrumentalist approaches to law allowed judges to sneak in their
54
own policy preferences when deciding cases.
It was this final critique that gave rise to the neoformalists. For
the neoformalists, deploying concepts and using deductive reasoning
was not an empty exercise. It was an ineliminable part of legal
55
reasoning. If the law was to have any predictability, and if limits on
the discretion of judges and other legal decisionmakers were to be

52. See generally, e.g., Joseph William Singer, Something Important in Humanity, 37 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2002) (criticizing law-and-economics scholars Louis Kaplow and Steven
Shavell for failing to account for fairness and justice while pursuing the promotion of human
welfare).
53. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 50, at 1741 (arguing that the “Holmes-Prosser
model” of judicial inquiry is undisciplined, leading to unhelpful, “arbitrary, indeterminate, and
doctrinally unstable” decisions, and that “[i]n addition, as every torts professor knows, the
reduction of negligence to policy analysis threatens to drain the analytic structure from torts”);
see also Solomon, Equal Accountability, supra note 4, at 1758 (noting concerns that
instrumentalism threatens to collapse law into public policy).
54. It was this concern that led judges and scholars such as Justice Antonin Scalia to call for
a return to formalism. See Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The
Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“Long
live formalism. It is what makes a government a government of laws and not of men.”); see also
Michael C. Dorf, Foreword, The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 4, 26 (1998)
(“For Justice Scalia, purposivism is indistinguishable from the common law method of case-bycase development of the law, in which judges assess the policy implications of various proposed
rules of law, constrained only loosely by analogies to prior cases.”); Earl M. Maltz, The Dark
Side of State Court Activism, 63 TEX. L. REV. 995, 996 (1985) (“The most obvious example of
judicial influence on lawmaking is in the development of the common law. Although
institutional constraints limit judicial action to some degree, the general policy preferences of
judges will clearly have a strong effect on the content of common-law rules.”); Maimon
Schwarzschild, Keeping It Private, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677, 687 (2007) (“The problem of
judges as lawmakers in a democratic society is a familiar one. Judges are not readily answerable
to the electorate. Hence, judicial lawmaking is in tension with democratic legitimacy, if not at
odds with it.”).
55. See Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench:
How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (“According to the formalists,
judges apply the governing law to the facts of a case in a logical, mechanical, and deliberative
way.”); Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J.
949, 956 (1988) (“In the formalist conception, law has a content that is not imported from
without but elaborated from within.”). See generally Martin Stone, Formalism, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 166 (Jules Coleman & Scott
Shapiro eds., 2002) (outlining the development of formalism and its relationship to deductive
reasoning).
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meaningful, then there had to be a check on judges simply
implementing their own policy preferences. The formal mode of
reasoning provided such a check.
In the 1980s and 1990s, a revival in thinking about rights
occurred. This revival pushed back against prior critiques that rights
were simply convenient labels to be used to mask whatever policy
56
preferences a litigant, scholar, or judge was asserting. Legal theorists
such as Ronald Dworkin posited a meaningful role for rights in the
57
context of judicial review. Although “rights talk” enjoyed its most
significant revival in the area of public law or constitutional rights, the
idea of private-law rights emerged again as well. There has been a
renewed interest in the importance of private-law rights—indeed, in
the very idea that there is a coherent set of concepts called private
58
law—led by the work of philosophers like Jules Coleman and Ernest
59
Weinrib in tort theory and by scholars like Charles Fried in contract
60
theory. In both tort and contract theory, the philosophers have
pushed back against the economists and argued that deploying ideas
like rights, duties, fairness, and justice constitute a more accurate and
61
better way to think about these areas of law.
Much of this writing has been under the umbrella of “corrective
62
justice.” For corrective-justice theorists, private law’s unification of
63
the victim and the wrongdoer has normative significance. The
wrongdoer has breached a duty owed to the victim rather than to
society at large, and so the wrongdoer now owes amends to the

56. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 50, at 1793–97 (describing a resurgence of rightsbased reasoning in order to further “highlight the oddity of the continued rejection of duty
analysis in negligence scholarship”).
57. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 51, at xi, 142–43.
58. See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS (1992).
59. See generally ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995).
60. See generally CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF
CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION (1981).
61. See, e.g., COLEMAN, supra note 58, at 382 (“[T]he victim’s connection to his injurer is
fundamental and analytic, not tenuous or contingent. Thus, even if the current structure of tort
litigation is consistent with economic analysis, it is better understood as embodying some
conception of corrective justice.”); WEINRIB, supra note 59, at 132–33 (“[E]conomic analysis
makes the wrong kind of considerations the primary building blocks of its enterprise. At the
core of this treatment of welfare lies a straightforward idea: welfare cannot supply the
normative underpinning for private law because private law relationships are bipolar and
welfare is not.”).
62. For a summary of the leading theories of corrective justice, see Solomon, Judging
Plaintiffs, supra note 4, at 1759–60.
63. See id. at 1759 & n.52 (citing WEINRIB, supra note 59, at 56–83).
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victim. The practice of corrective justice, for many such theorists,
helps restore the normative equilibrium among individuals in a
64
society.
We are also attracted to, and have written about, a relatively new
65
theory of individual justice called civil recourse. Civil recourse takes
as central components of private law that the plaintiff both decides
66
whether to bring the case and prosecutes the case herself. Like
corrective justice, civil recourse sees normative significance in the
plaintiff bringing her claim directly against the defendant, as opposed
67
to bringing a demand to the attention of the state, for example. And
civil recourse sees torts specifically as a law of private wrongs, not as a
68
vehicle for loss allocation or deterrence of risky activity.
The idea of private-law rights, though, is so closely associated
with the Lochner doctrine that invoking such rights often invites
69
70
skepticism from legal scholars. Lochner v. New York, of course,

64. See id. at 1784–87.
65. Civil-recourse theory was first introduced by Benjamin C. Zipursky in Rights, Wrongs,
and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 6 (1998) [hereinafter Zipursky, Rights,
Wrongs, and Recourse]. Shortly afterwards, John C.P. Goldberg and Zipursky addressed the
theory in The Moral of MacPherson, supra note 50, which largely focused on the relationality of
duty but also asserted that a relational-duty approach should go hand in hand with a civilrecourse theory of tort law, id. at 1826. Professors Goldberg and Zipursky have extended this
relationality-and-recourse approach in several joint articles since and have also developed civilrecourse theory separately in, especially: John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort
Law: Due Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005);
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 718–21 (2003)
[hereinafter Zipursky, Civil Recourse]; and Benjamin C. Zipursky, Philosophy of Private Law,
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE & PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 55, at
623.
66. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 65, at 754 (“[C]orrective justice theory itself
misses the true structure of tort law. Tort law is a system in which individuals are empowered to
bring rights of actions against those who have committed torts—legal wrongs—against
them . . . .”).
67. See Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 65, at 92 (“The justice in the
enforcement of private law lies in recognizing in those who are aggrieved a right to recourse
against those who wronged them. It does not lie in the justice of bringing about a state of affairs
that is optimal from a social point of view, whether corrective, distributive, or economic
considerations provide the criteria of optimality.”).
68. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
917, 972 (2010) (arguing that “a wrongs-based account of Torts connects elegantly to a plausible
and appealing account of tort law’s place in our legal system”).
69. See Grey, supra note 30, at 476 (“Starting with Holmes in the 1890s, reformist
American legal thinkers yoked the private law conceptualism of Langdell and his followers to
the activist classical-liberal judicial review of the Lochner era.” (footnote omitted)). For a more
positive view of Lochner, see generally DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER:
DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011).
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was a case wherein the right of freedom of contract was used to strike
71
down New York State’s regulation of bakery workers’ hours.
Professor Cass Sunstein and others critiqued the doctrine as
enshrining a notion of common-law baselines that were somehow pre72
political and natural. This view was taken as gospel among legal
73
elites, at least until recently. Indeed, even in Kelo v. City of New
74
London, a case with very good facts for proponents of private-law
rights, a 5–4 decision from the Supreme Court upheld the state
interest in economic development against the right to private use of
75
76
one’s property. Moreover, in an age of statutes, judges may think
that legitimate state interests can only be found in legislative codes
when they cannot be inferred from constitutional text. Looking for
such rights in the common law might seem like praying to the
77
“brooding omnipresence in the sky.” Finally, private law may have a
discredited pedigree in the court simply because of its association
78
with the evils of litigiousness.
70. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
71. Id. at 64.
72. See HOWARD GILMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE FOUNDING VISION OF A
FACTION-FREE REPUBLIC, THE INTENSIFICATION OF CLASS CONFLICT AND CONSTITUTIONAL
IDEOLOGY DURING THE LOCHNER ERA 433 (1988) (claiming that the redirection of the Court’s
role in the political system required justices to come up with a reliable method of “specifying
those ‘natural’ rights and liberties that liberalism claims are possessed by all individuals”); Cass
R. Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 875 (1987) (“Numerous decisions
depend in whole or in part on common law baselines or understandings of inaction and
neutrality that owe their origin to Lochner-like understandings.”).
73. See, e.g., David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the
Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. L.J. 1, 11–12 (2003) (“Among
constitutional law professors, the most popular understanding of Lochner is Cass Sunstein’s
view that the Court believed that common law rules were natural and immutable and therefore
formed the appropriate baseline from which to judge the constitutionality of regulatory
legislation. Legal historians, meanwhile, pay little heed to Sunstein’s rather impressionistic
understanding of Lochner . . . . [A different] understanding of Lochner is gradually winning an
increasing audience among mainstream constitutional scholars and threatens to eventually
supplant Sunstein’s interpretation as the conventional understanding of Lochner among law
professors.” (footnote omitted)).
74. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
75. Id. at 489–90; see also Richard A. Epstein, Supreme Folly, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2005,
at A14 (“Last week’s regrettable 5–4 decision in Kelo v. City of New London marks a new low
point in the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence.”).
76. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES
(1982).
77. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
78. See Jamal Greene, Heller High Water? The Future of Originalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y
REV. 325, 342 (2009) (“If any other theme has emerged from the votes of Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Alito, it is an apparent hostility to litigation—continuing the views of their

OMAN & SOLOMON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/25/2013 12:15 PM

THE COURT’S THEORY OF PRIVATE LAW

1125

This then was the intellectual backdrop when the Supreme Court
considered the clash between private law and the First Amendment
during the October 2010 Term in Snyder.
II. SNYDER AND THE SPEECH TORTS: A WINDOW INTO THE
SUPREME COURT’S THEORY OF PRIVATE LAW
A. Snyder v. Phelps
On Friday, March 3, 2006, Lance Corporal Matthew A. Snyder
of the Combat Service Support Group-1, First Marine Logistics
Group, First Marine Expeditionary Force, died in Iraq’s Anbar
79
province when the Humvee in which he was riding overturned. He
had been in Iraq for one month and had been a Marine for three
80
81
years. He was twenty years old. Lance Corporal Snyder had grown
up in the small Maryland town of Westminster and had only recently
82
graduated from the local high school. Indeed, prior to shipping out
to Iraq, the Marine Corps had sent Lance Corporal Snyder back as a
83
recruiter to his high school. His death was a major event in the small
84
town. School administrators announced it to the students and
teachers at the high school, where David Brown, the assistant
principal, had coached Lance Corporal Snyder as a six-year-old
85
basketball player. His mother was too grief-stricken to speak with
the media, deputizing her sister—Lance Corporal Snyder’s
86
godmother—to act as her spokesperson. Al Snyder, his father, said,

predecessors . . . .”); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as
an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1181 (2006)
(“[T]he Rehnquist Court consistently expressed little patience with lower courts that have
attempted to carve out for themselves a broader role in resolving disputes and administering
justice.”); Kenneth W. Starr, The Roberts Court at Age Three: A Response, 54 WAYNE L. REV.
1015, 1025 (2008) (“[T]he Roberts Court, more than any Court in recent memory, is skeptical of
the efficacy of large-scale civil litigation.”).
79. Nicole Fuller & Gina Davis, Carroll Co. Marine, 20, Killed in Iraq, BALT. SUN., Mar. 7,
2006, at 1B; News at Five (ABC television broadcast Mar. 10, 2006) (transcript on file with the
Duke Law Journal).
80. Fuller & Davis, supra note 79.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See generally, e.g., id.; News at Five, supra note 79; Ari Natter, Westminster Marine Dies
in Iraq, CARROLL CNTY. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at 1A.
85. Fuller & Davis, supra note 79.
86. Id.
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“He was a hero, and he was the love of my life.” A week later, the
family held a funeral for Lance Corporal Snyder at their Catholic
88
church.
In 1955, Fred Phelps founded the Westboro Baptist Church in
89
Topeka, Kansas. The church describes itself as an “Old School (or,
Primitive) Baptist Church” but is not associated with the Southern
90
Baptist Convention or any other mainstream Baptist denomination.
Firmly believing in the Calvinist doctrines of total human depravity
and limited atonement, the Westboro Baptist Church insists that
91
there are many people that God despises and will refuse to save. The
websites run by the church provide a litany of those to whom God’s
grace will not extend and whom he accordingly hates:
www.GodHatesFags.com, www.GodHatesIslam.com, www.GodHates
TheMedia.com, www.GodHatesTheWorld.com, www.JewsKilled
Jesus.com,
www.BeastObama.com,
www.PriestsRapeBoys.com,
92
www.blogs.SpareNot.com, and www.AmericaisDoomed.com. Much
of the church’s preaching focuses on homosexuality and the
punishments that God has purportedly been raining down on
America because of its tolerance toward homosexuals, including
93
homosexuals in the military. Since 1991, the church claims to have
conducted over 47,000 “sidewalk demonstrations” in which they have
held aloft signs declaring “God Hates Fags,” “AIDS Cures Fags,”
94
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Fag Troops,” and the like.
On March 10, 2006, members of the Westboro Baptist Church
95
arrived in Westminster to protest Lance Corporal Snyder’s funeral.
They had previously contacted the local police, who informed them
that they would have to conduct their protest one thousand feet from
96
the chapel where the funeral was to be held. Protests by the church
87. Id.
88. Gina Davis, At Carroll Funeral, a National Protest, BALT. SUN., Mar. 11, 2006, at 1A.
89. Westboro Baptist Church, About Us, GOD HATES FAGS http://www.godhatesfags.com/
wbcinfo/aboutwbc.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Westboro Baptist Church, Frequently Asked Questions, GOD HATES FAGS,
http://www.godhatesfags.com/faq.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2013).
93. Id.
94. Westboro Baptist Church, supra note 89.
95. Davis, supra note 88; News at Five, supra note 79.
96. Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Rules for Anti-Gay Protesters at Funerals (National
Public Radio broadcast Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.npr.org/2011/03/02/134194491/
high-court-rules-for-military-funeral-protesters.
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had previously attracted the attention of veterans, who formed the
Patriot Guard Riders, a motorcycle gang that converges on funerals
targeted by the Westboro Baptist Church and forms a cordon of
leather-clad, flag waving bikers to shield family members from the
97
protesters. Bikers from up and down the East Coast converged on
Lance Corporal Snyder’s funeral and ringed the edge of the parish
98
church where the funeral was held. Not surprisingly, the event
attracted media attention, leading the local television news broadcasts
99
and making the front page of the Baltimore Sun. The Westboro
Baptist Church subsequently published an extensive manifesto on its
website defending the protests at the funeral and accusing the
Snyders of raising their child to support child molestation in the
100
Catholic Church, thus earning divine retribution.
The church’s protests had also attracted the attention of
Maryland state legislators, who introduced a law designed to protect
mourning families from protestors by making it a crime to protest in
101
close proximity to funerals. This law, however, was prospective only
102
and was thus aimed at controlling the behavior of future protestors.
It gave Lance Corporal Snyder’s parents no means of redress against
those who had turned their son’s funeral into a national media event.
Maryland’s common law of torts, however, did provide an
avenue of redress. In 1977, the Maryland Supreme Court recognized
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the case of

97. Davis, supra note 88.
98. Id.
99. See, e.g., id.; News at Five, supra note 79.
100. Westboro Baptist Church, Where Can I Find “The Burden of Marine Lance Cpl.
Matthew Synder” Epic??, WBC BLOGS: THE WORKMEN BLOG (Oct. 11, 2011),
http://blogs.sparenot.com/workmen/2011/10/11/where-can-i-find-the-burden-of-marine-lancecpl-matthew-a-snyder-epic.
101. H.B. 850, 421st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2006) (codified as amended at MD.
CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-205 (LexisNexis 2012)).
102. Id. The law’s stated purpose is:
[P]rohibiting a person from knowingly obstructing, hindering, impeding, or blocking
another person’s entry to or exit from a burial, memorial service, funeral, or funeral
procession under certain circumstances; prohibiting a person from addressing certain
speech to a person attending a funeral, burial, memorial service, or funeral procession
that is likely to incite or produce an imminent breach of the peace; prohibiting certain
picketing; providing penalties for a violation of this Act; making the provisions of this
Act severable; and generally relating to prohibiting certain speech likely to incite or
produce an imminent breach of the peace and acts at burials, memorial services,
funerals, or funeral processions under certain circumstances.
H.B. 850.
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103

Harris v. Jones. Building on case law from other jurisdictions, the
104
Restatement (Second) of Torts, and academic commentary, the court
crafted a tort designed to provide redress against “one who by
extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
105
severe emotional distress.” As examples of severe emotional
distress, the court cited cases involving false allegations of child
106
molestation and misconduct surrounding the death of a loved one.
On June 5, 2006, Al Snyder availed himself of this law and sued the
Westboro Baptist Church protesters in federal district court in
107
Maryland.
The jury eventually awarded Al Snyder $2.9 million in
compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages, which the
108
district court reduced to $2.1 million. Phelps appealed to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing that Maryland’s tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress violated the Free Speech Clause of the
109
First Amendment. The Fourth Circuit agreed, and Snyder appealed
110
to the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari. The
111
Court upheld the Fourth Circuit’s decision.
B. Doctrinal Background—First Amendment Versus State Tort Law
The majority opinion in Snyder by Chief Justice Roberts
represents the culmination of a long series of cases in which the Court
has considered the relationship between the First Amendment and
state tort law. The Court’s jurisprudence in this area begins with
Sullivan, a case that grew out of the Civil Rights movement and the
112
struggle against segregation in Alabama. On March 29, 1960, the

103. See Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 614 (Md. 1977) (holding that “the independent tort
of infliction of emotional distress should be sanctioned in Maryland”).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965).
105. Harris, 380 A.2d at 613 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
106. Id. at 613–14, 617.
107. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir.
2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
108. Id. at 595, 597.
109. Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 206, 211 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
110. Snyder v. Phelps, 130 S. Ct. 1737 (2010).
111. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1221 (2011).
112. Mr. Sullivan, one of three Commissioners of the City of Montgomery, Alabama,
brought his “action against the four individual petitioners, who are Negroes and Alabama
clergymen, and against petitioner the New York Times Company.” N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
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New York Times ran a paid advertisement in the form of an editorial
113
entitled “Heed Their Rising Voices.” The editorial described events
in Montgomery, Alabama related to the student protests against the
continuing unwillingness of the state to comply with various
114
desegregation orders. It was undisputed that the advertisement as
published contained various false statements about the Montgomery
115
police department. For example, it stated that police had “ringed”
the university campus when, in fact, the police had only been
stationed nearby, and it claimed that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. had
been arrested seven times when, in fact, he had only been arrested
116
four times.
Sullivan, one of Montgomery’s elected police
commissioners, sued the Times for libel and was awarded $500,000 in
compensatory damages by an Alabama jury, although neither
Sullivan nor the police commission was mentioned in the
117
advertisement.
The Times appealed to the Supreme Court, which ruled that for
a public official to prevail in a tort action based on critical speech he
must not only show that the statement is false and was made with
“actual malice,” but he must also prove these elements with
118
“convincing clarity.” Strikingly, the Court’s opinion, authored by
Justice Brennan, reveals a view that sees private law as essentially
indistinguishable from other forms of government regulation. This
can be seen, for example, in the Court’s rejection of Sullivan’s stateaction argument. The Court wrote:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama
courts have applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to

113. Heed Their Rising Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 1960, at L25.
114. See id. (“In [the students’ efforts] to uphold these guarantees [in the Constitution and
the Bill of Rights], they are being met by an unprecedented wave of terror by those who would
deny and negate that document which the whole world looks upon as setting the pattern for
modern freedom . . . .”). As the Court described the article, “[s]ucceeding paragraphs purported
to illustrate the ‘wave of terror’ by describing certain alleged events.” Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256–
57.
115. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 258 (“It is uncontroverted that some of the statements
contained in the two paragraphs were not accurate descriptions of the events which occurred in
Montgomery.”).
116. Id. at 259.
117. Id. at 256, 258.
118. See id. at 285–86 (“[W]e consider that the proof presented to show actual malice lacks
the convincing clarity which the constitutional standard demands . . . .”); id. at 287 (“The mere
presence of the stories in the files does not, of course, establish that the Times ‘knew’ the
advertisement was false . . . .”).

OMAN & SOLOMON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1130

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/25/2013 12:15 PM

[Vol. 62:1109

impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional freedoms of
speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a
civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by
119
statute.

Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court wrote disparagingly of attempts
to draw distinctions between libel law and other forms of restrictions
120
on speech as “mere labels of state law.” Hammering away at the
equivalence between private law and other forms of government
regulation, Justice Brennan wrote, “What a state may not
constitutionally bring about by means of a criminal statute is likewise
121
beyond the reach of its civil law of libel.”
The Constitution prohibits the suppression of political speech by
the state. The Court’s key point was that, like the other attempts to
suppress the speech that its opinion listed, the effect of libel damages
122
was to penalize speech critical of public officials. As even critics of
the Court’s decision have acknowledged, it was surely correct that
“[w]hether or not a newspaper can survive a succession of [civil]
judgments, the pall of fear and timidity imposed upon those who
would give voice to public criticism is an atmosphere in which the
123
First Amendment freedoms cannot survive.” Hence, the Court
124
focused on “a State’s power to award damages for libel,” seeing the
purpose—or at any rate the effect—of libel law in terms of the
125
suppression of libelous speech by the government.
119. Id. at 265. The “state rule of law” to which the Court refers, id., is at sections 908 to 917
of Title 7 of the Alabama Code.
120. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 269 (“[W]e are compelled by neither precedent nor policy to
give any more weight to the epithet ‘libel’ than we have to other ‘mere labels’ of state law.”
(quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963))).
121. Id. at 277.
122. See id. at 269–70 (“Like insurrection, contempt, advocacy of unlawful acts, breach of
the peace, obscenity, solicitation of legal business, and the various other formulae for the
repression of expression that have been challenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic
immunity from constitutional limitations. . . . Thus, we consider this case against the background
of a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” (footnotes omitted)).
123. Id. at 278; see also, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?,
53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782, 790 (1986) (“Nonetheless the states cannot be allowed to define
defamation as they please. If they could, they might expand the boundaries of the tort until it
covers what, in strict theory, belongs within the domain of protected speech.”).
124. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 283.
125. See id. at 278 (“Plainly the Alabama law of civil libel is ‘a form of regulation that
creates hazards to protected freedoms markedly greater than those that attend reliance upon
the criminal law.’” (quoting Bantam Books, Inc., v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963))). But see id.
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Given the context of Sullivan, it is unsurprising that the Court
saw the libel action at issue in the case primarily in terms of the state’s
126
effort to suppress critical speech. First, the case arose in the context
of the largely unsuccessful attempt by the federal courts to force
127
southern states to desegregate. Second, and related, given that the
connection between the advertisement and Sullivan was tenuous at
best, and that criticism by outside agitators (such as those who
purchased the New York Times advertisement) likely enhanced—
rather than libeled—Sullivan’s political reputation, it is unsurprising
that the Court saw the lawsuit mainly as an effort to muffle criticism
128
of segregationist policies. There is every indication that speech
129
suppression is exactly what the suit was intended to do. Indeed,
though the majority opinion was coy on this point, the concurring
opinion by Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, was more
forthright. Justice Black wrote:
One of the acute and highly emotional issues in this country arises
out of efforts of many people, even including some public officials,
to continue state-commanded segregation of races in the public
schools and other public places, despite our several holdings that
such a state practice is forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Montgomery is one of the localities in which widespread hostility to
desegregation has been manifested. This hostility has sometimes
extended itself to persons who favor desegregation, particularly to
so-called “outside agitators,” a term which can be made to fit papers
130
like the Times, which is published in New York.

Given this background, it is easy to understand why the justices
concluded, in the words of Justice Black’s concurrence, that “state
at 281 (quoting a decision by the Kansas Supreme Court weighing the importance of public
discussion against the “occasional injury to the reputations of individuals” (quoting Coleman v.
MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 286 (Kan. 1908)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
126. See supra notes 119–122 and accompanying text.
127. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT
SOCIAL CHANGE? 42–54 (1991) (discussing the relative ineffectiveness of judicially mandated
desegregation).
128. See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 151 (Vintage Books 1992) (1991) (“No doubt Justice Brennan and those who
joined his opinion of the Court were also aware of those realities [about race and political
incentives raised in Justice Black’s concurrence].”).
129. See id. at 42 (“Commissioner Sullivan’s real target was the role of the American press
as an agent of democratic change. He and the other Southern officials who had sued the Times
for libel were trying to choke off a process that was educating the country about the nature of
racism and was affecting political attitudes on that issue.”).
130. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 294 (Black, J., concurring).
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libel laws threaten the very existence of an American press virile
enough to publish unpopular views on public affairs and bold enough
131
to criticize the conduct of public officials.” The majority also
displayed a distinct lack of trust in the Alabama courts, resolving the
132
case on the merits before remanding it to the local court. Though
the majority justified this action in the name of “effective judicial
133
administration,” the procedural ploy makes it clear that the
majority shared the concurrence’s belief that libel law was being used
134
as a weapon to suppress critical speech. Indeed, one of the striking
things about the Alabama law at issue in the case is that it was not the
common law of libel but rather a statutory creation that, through a
series of shifted presumptions, made it very easy for public officials to
obtain libel judgments for any factually inaccurate statement, even if
135
the errors were relatively trivial.
Nearly twenty-five years later, in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
136
Falwell, the Court extended its approach in Sullivan to cases
involving the intentional infliction of emotional distress, holding that
a public figure could not recover damages against the publisher of a
parody that had otherwise satisfied the common-law requirements for
137
the tort. The case involved a mock advertisement published by
Larry Flint’s Hustler Magazine featuring a drunken and incestuous
sexual encounter in an outhouse between conservative televangelist
138
Jerry Falwell and his mother. In overturning Falwell’s damage
award, the Court once again conceptualized damages as a form of
139
“governmentally imposed sanctions.” According to the opinion by
131. Id.
132. See id. at 292 (majority opinion) (“The judgment of the Supreme Court of Alabama is
reversed and the case is remanded to that court for further proceeding not inconsistent with this
opinion.”).
133. Id. at 284.
134. See id. at 291–92 (discussing the “disquieting implications” of the Alabama court’s
transformation of impersonal governmental criticism “into personal criticism, and hence
potential libel, of the officials of whom the government is composed”).
135. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
136. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
137. Id. at 50 (“Respondent would have us find that a State’s interest in protecting public
figures from emotional distress is sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that
is patently offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury, even when that speech could not
reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved. This
we decline to do.”).
138. Id. at 47–48.
139. Id. at 51; see also id. at 50–51 (“‘[T]he freedom to speak one’s mind is not only an
aspect of individual liberty—and thus a good unto itself—but also is essential to the common
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, the purpose of the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress is to impose a “sanction in the form of
140
damages” and “prevent[] emotional harm.” Hence, the state interest
to be balanced against First Amendment values was its ability to
control its citizens’ behavior by suppressing a particular activity—
offensive speech—through a system of monetary punishments.
This does not mean, however, that the Court’s modern First
Amendment jurisprudence has always conceptualized state tort law in
terms of government regulation and the suppression of speech. In
141
Rosenblatt v. Baer, the Court considered who should be treated as a
“public official” for purposes of Sullivan’s “actual malice”
142
The Court entertained the possibility that the
requirements.
manager of a ski resort owned by a New Hampshire county was a
“public official” and therefore faced the heightened requirements of
143
New York Times. Writing for the Court, however, Justice Brennan
emphasized, “This conclusion does not ignore the important social
values which underlie the law of defamation. Society has a pervasive
and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon
144
reputation.” In his concurring opinion, Justice Stewart was even
more forceful:
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from
unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our
basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human
being—a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.
The protection of private personality, like the protection of life
itself, is left primarily to the individual States under the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments. But this does not mean that the right is entitled
to any less recognition by this Court as a basic of our constitutional
system. . . . The First and Fourteenth Amendments have not

quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.’ We have therefore been particularly
vigilant to ensure that individual expressions of ideas remain free from governmentally imposed
sanctions.” (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union
of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503–04 (1984))).
140. Id. at 52–53.
141. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
142. Id. at 77; see also id. at 86 (“Where a position in government has such apparent
importance that the public has an independent interest in the qualifications and performance of
the person who holds it, beyond the general public interest in the qualifications and
performance of all government employees, both elements we identified in New York Times are
present and the New York Times malice standards apply.” (footnote omitted)).
143. Id. at 87.
144. Id. at 86 (emphasis added).
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stripped private citizens of all means of redress for injuries inflicted
145
upon them by careless liars.

Notice that both Justice Brennan and Justice Stewart
conceptualize tort law as serving more than merely the state’s interest
in preventing speech damaging to reputation. They also see the law as
providing an avenue of redress for wronged plaintiffs. In other words,
the law is not merely a mechanism for controlling the behavior of
citizens. It also serves to empower private parties to act against those
who have wronged them. Indeed, Justice Stewart suggested that the
availability of this agency has its roots in the idea of “ordered liberty”
146
and may be independently protected by the Constitution.
By 2011 and Snyder, however, the image of tort law as a
mechanism for the regulation of speech was firmly entrenched in the
147
Court’s jurisprudence. Strikingly, for an opinion declaring a wellestablished common-law claim unconstitutional, Chief Justice
Roberts’s majority opinion in Snyder does not even attempt to
articulate a justification for state tort law, instead focusing the bulk of
148
its discussion on the nature of Westboro’s speech. The opinion
149
but, if
acknowledged the plaintiff’s deep emotional distress,
anything, this acknowledgment served to strengthen Phelps’s First
150
Amendment claim. The acknowledgment did this by bolstering the
majority opinion’s conceptualization of tort law as doing little more
151
than seeking to punish and suppress distressing speech.

145. Id. at 92–93 (Stewart, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 92.
147. Both sides’ briefs in Snyder reflect this point. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 19, Snyder
v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09-751), 2010 WL 2145497, at *19 (“[T]he First
Amendment protects speakers from tort liability only when there is a reasonable relationship
between the ‘matter of public concern’ and the speech’s target.”); Brief for Respondents at 18,
Snyder, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (No. 09-751), 2010 WL 2826988, at *18 (“Hustler . . . requires that any
speech on public matters that is targeted by the tort of [intentional infliction of emotional
distress] must be shown false and uttered with actual malice.”).
148. See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1217 (“The fact that Westboro spoke in connection with a
funeral, however, cannot by itself transform the nature of Westboro’s speech.”).
149. Id. at 1217–18.
150. See id. at 1219 (“The record confirms that any distress occasioned by Westboro’s
picketing turned on the content and viewpoint of the message conveyed, rather than any
interference with the funeral itself. A group of parishioners standing at the very spot where
Westboro stood, holding signs that said ‘God Bless America’ and ‘God Loves You,’ would not
have been subjected to liability. It was what Westboro said that exposed it to tort damages.”).
151. See id. (“What Westboro said, in the whole context of how and where it chose to say it,
is entitled to ‘special protection’ under the First Amendment, and that protection cannot be
overcome by a jury finding that the picketing was outrageous.”).
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In his concurrence, which made clear that he favored a case-bycase approach to balancing First Amendment and tort interests,
Justice Breyer conceptualized the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress in terms of the state’s effort to regulate a certain
kind of behavior.
To uphold the application of state law in these circumstances would
punish Westboro for seeking to communicate its views on matters of
public concern without proportionately advancing the State’s
152
interest in protecting its citizens against severe emotional harm.

Notice, however, that Justice Breyer’s defense of the state interest
remains couched in the regulatory vision of tort law that has
dominated the Court’s jurisprudence since Sullivan.
Only Justice Alito expressed concern, writing a dissent in which
he insisted that the First Amendment does not mean that the
Westboro Baptist Church “may intentionally inflict severe emotional
injury on private persons at a time of intense emotional sensitivity by
launching vicious verbal attacks that make no contribution to public
153
debate.” The bulk of his opinion focused on the church’s tactic of
using funerals to garner public attention, the limited public interest of
the attacks directed specifically at Snyder and his family, and the wide
154
availability of other fora in which to share their public message. But
even Justice Alito conceded the majority’s assumption that tort law
was a form of regulation, with liability designed to deter unwanted
speech. Hence, he wrote, “[t]o protect against such injury, most if not
all jurisdictions permit recovery in tort for the intentional infliction of
155
emotional distress.”
C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
The assumption that tort law is a form of government regulation
is particularly strange in light of the tort at issue in Snyder—
intentional infliction of emotional distress. Although the verdict in
that case was based on an invasion of privacy claim as well, the
conflict between intentional infliction of emotional distress and the
156
First Amendment was the main issue on appeal. The intentional
152. Id. at 1222 (Breyer, J., concurring).
153. Id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 1223–26.
155. Id. at 1222 (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
156. Id. at 1213 (majority opinion).
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infliction of emotional distress tort provides a clear example of a tort
that was created by judges to provide redress for victims of wrongs,
157
and in doing so, to reinforce social equality. Even the most
committed economists would have a hard time making the descriptive
claim that intentional infliction of emotional distress was created as a
means of government putting a price on certain kinds of harmful
activity so as to discourage it.
The origins of the tort lie in early twentieth-century cases in
which individuals suffered harm from passing trains, but without
158
direct physical contact. These cases, analyzed in depth by Professor
Barbara Welke and by Professors Martha Chamallas and Jennifer
159
Wriggins in recent books, were known as “fright” cases. The word
“fright” refers to the kind of injury that people thought women had
suffered when trains passed too close to their homes, stopped
160
suddenly in front of them, and the like. But fright was not even
161
considered to be an injury at the time, simply a condition. And it
was a condition invoked particularly by women, who were not
162
represented among judges and juries.
The early lawsuits against the railroads in these circumstances
163
generally failed. In not recognizing these injuries, the courts were
saying (one might argue) that those who suffer these kinds of
injuries—here, women—do not count. When courts moved later to
recognize emotional distress as legitimate, they were validating the
157. See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits of
Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 42, 42 (1982) (“The tort provides recovery to victims of socially reprehensible
conduct, and leaves it to the judicial process to determine, on a case-by-case basis, what conduct
should be so characterized.”).
158. BARBARA YOUNG WELKE, RECASTING AMERICAN LIBERTY: GENDER, RACE, LAW,
AND THE RAILROAD REVOLUTION, 1865–1920, at 229–31 (2001).
159. See, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER B. WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY:
RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 39–46 (2010); WELKE, supra note 158, at 203–34.
160. CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 159, at 40; Martha Chamallas & Linda K.
Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 826–43
(1990) (describing early railroad-related fright cases).
161. E.g., WELKE, supra note 158, at 229–31; Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 160, at 819–
21.
162. E.g., WELKE, supra note 158, at 229–31; Chamallas & Kerber, supra note 160, at 819–
21.
163. See, e.g., CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 159, at 40 (“As with so many other
legal disputes, the choice of classification was crucial: if the claim was for mental disturbance,
there would be no recovery . . . .”); WELKE, supra note 158, at 212 (“In New York,
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and the few states that followed their lead, gender and class
combined with other factors to shape a rule of no liability for nervous ills . . . .”).
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very real injuries that women had suffered, and they were affirming
164
women’s equal claim to personhood. Recognizing this new tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress thus can be seen as the
state putting its imprimatur on certain conduct as wrong, and on a
class of plaintiffs as morally entitled to demand redress or justice.
How does this lens help us understand Snyder? It was
unacceptable for Phelps to treat Snyder, a father grieving his son’s
loss, as simply a pawn in his larger plan to alert the country to the
moral rot that Phelps believed was taking place. Providing redress for
intentional infliction of emotional distress is a way that the state can
underscore Snyder’s equal moral worth. Snyder’s claim is a chapter
that fits easily in the story of a tort that has been significantly
involved in the evolution of social norms on how to treat different
kinds of people over the last century. But it is a poor fit for a story
about the government’s attempt to regulate harmful activity. Which
brings us to the puzzle: why did all three opinions in Snyder assume
that the underlying tort law was simply a species of government
regulation? It is this question that we attempt to unpack in Part III.
III. UNPACKING THE SUPREME COURT’S
THEORY OF PRIVATE LAW
In this Part, we unpack the Supreme Court’s theory of private
law through the lens of Snyder. In our view, the conception of private
law as government regulation comes from a combination of (1) the
doctrinal tools that judges use in First Amendment cases, (2) the
unitary nature of the state-action doctrine, and (3) the influence of
instrumentalism in obscuring the plaintiff’s agency and the state
interest in redress, while privileging a particular view of
compensation. We explain what we mean by this in the proceeding
discussion, and then in Part IV, we offer some preliminary thoughts
on the normative implications if the Court were more attentive to the
rights to redress embedded in private law.
A. First Amendment Doctrine
Generalizing about First Amendment doctrine is a dangerous
task. The Supreme Court and First Amendment scholars generally
164. See WELKE, supra note 158, at 234 (“In the law of nervous shock, courts not only
acknowledged the extent of the dependence and vulnerability which defined modern life, they
as well extended the sphere of the law’s protection to the intangible space of the mind. In so
doing, they contributed to a redefinition of the scope of liberty in modern life.”).
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agree, however, that most First Amendment cases involve assessing
the First Amendment values at stake in light of the state interest in
165
the underlying law being challenged. This analysis, though, does not
166
amount to a simple balancing of the scales.
The problem in the speech-tort context, though, is that the
Supreme Court’s theory of private law skews the way that both the
First Amendment and state tort interests are assessed. Specifically,
the Supreme Court’s theory reinforces two mistaken assumptions
about the purpose and effect of state tort law. First, on the stateinterest side, it bolsters the suspicion that an illicit purpose or motive
167
168
is at work. If the state is regulating, then it must be suppressing.
This is, after all, what “deterrence” is all about: preventing the
wrongful conduct (here, speech) from happening in the first place.
Second, the theory of private law as regulation is providing a
presumption of “effects” on the First Amendment side of the
169
equation: that speech will indeed be suppressed.
Recall that First Amendment doctrine strives to strike a balance
between the constitutional interest in speech on the one hand, and the
state interests in redress or regulation on the other. In doing this, the
doctrine uses the basic categories of “content-based” and “contentneutral” regulation to serve as a rough divide between suspicious and
165. The majority opinion in Snyder itself explicitly acknowledged that this was its task,
though without using the disfavored “balancing” word: “As we have noted, ‘the sensitivity and
significance of the interests presented in clashes between First Amendment and [state law]
rights counsel relying on limited principles that sweep no more broadly than the appropriate
context of the instant case.’” Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220 (2011) (alteration in
original) (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 533 (1989)).
166. See Frank I. Michelman, Discretionary Interests—Takings, Motives, and
Unconstitutional Conditions: Commentary on Radin and Sullivan, 55 ALB. L. REV. 619, 619–20
(1992) (asserting that balancing and categorizing are better seen as a reflection of judgments
about the importance of underlying governmental interests); Richard H. Pildes, Avoiding
Balancing: The Role of Exclusionary Reasons in Constitutional Law, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 711, 712
(1994) (arguing that constitutional adjudication is less about balancing, and more about
“defining the kinds of reasons that are impermissible justifications for state action in different
spheres”).
167. Alexander Bickel distinguished the term “motives” from “purposes” by arguing that
“motives” referred to the actual intention of legislators who supported the statute, while
“purposes” referred to what an outside observer would impute to the statute based on the
available evidence. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 61–63 (1962).
168. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594–2600 (2012) (discussing
the tax/penalty distinction, with taxes designed to put a price on activity and penalties designed
to suppress it). Thanks to Katie Ertmer for this interesting analogy.
169. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword, Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 56, 69–70 (1997) (discussing “effects tests”).
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170

less suspicious government action. This division has been criticized
171
as a crude one, but has been explained by scholars such as Professor
Jed Rubenfeld and now-Justice Elena Kagan as a proxy for or means
of “flushing out” suspect or illegitimate government motives, namely
172
suppressing disfavored speech.
This kind of doctrine—deploying tools for flushing out
173
“motive”—is common in constitutional adjudication. To be sure,
the Supreme Court has denied, in the seminal case United States v.
174
O’Brien, that government purpose is relevant, but scholars have
persuasively shown that the Court’s actions in subsequent cases prove
175
otherwise. In O’Brien, the Court was concerned about “effects” on
170. See Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 235 (2012)
(describing the “two basic ideas behind the content-discrimination principle” as being that it is
“usually wrong” for government to regulate based on the content of the speech, and “usually
acceptable” to regulate for other reasons).
171. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of
Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 50 (2000) (arguing
that the Court’s application of the distinction is “inconsistent”); Don Herzog, The Kerr
Principle, State Action, and Legal Rights, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2006) (observing that the
“alleged black-letter rule” that the state may not regulate speech on the basis of its content is
“blatantly false”); cf. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L.
REV. 145, 159 (arguing that the use of strict scrutiny in Equal Protection cases reflects an
empirical assumption about the “perceived likelihood of legitimate versus illegitimate
motives”).
172. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 77, at 441 (“By using these rules, courts could invalidate
laws supported by improper reasons without ever confronting the problems of proof generated
by a direct inquiry into motive. The function of the rules [is] in flushing out impermissibly
motivated actions . . . .”); Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV.
767, 794 (2001) (explaining that the narrow-tailoring test is used as a “smoking-out” device in
circumstances where the evidence gives rise to a “strong suspicion” of unconstitutional
purpose).
173. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Alexander, Introduction, Motivation and Constitutionality, 15
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 925, 926 (1978) (outlining the kinds of questions a theory of motivation
inquiry would have to answer (citing Paul Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the
Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 SUP. CT. REV. 95; and John Hart Ely,
Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970)));
Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 297, 302
(1997) (“This Article attempts to identify principles that the Court may use to guide its purpose
scrutiny in a manner consistent with its constitutional role.”).
174. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
175. See Caleb Nelson, Judicial Review of Legislative Purpose, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1784,
1787–88 (2008) (noting that, despite the Court’s protestation in O’Brien, courts had “long been
willing to consider some objective indicia of legislative purpose” in assessing the
constitutionality of a statute, even if they had been unwilling to scrutinize the “legislature’s
inner workings”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has acknowledged as much. See Sorrell v. IMS
Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663 (2011) (“Just as the ‘inevitable effect of a statute on its face may
render it unconstitutional,’ a statute’s stated purposes may also be considered.” (quoting
O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 384)).
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speech, another common test in constitutional adjudication. But
many perfectly permissible “content-neutral” regulations have the
effect of lessening the amount of speech—it is when the government
seeks to (again, purpose or motive is at work) suppress speech
177
because of its content that the Court gets worried.
One can argue, of course, that in a case like Snyder, this is
precisely what the government is doing through its agent, the jury. It
is regulating Phelps’s speech because it is “outrageous,” a judgment
about content and a key element in the intentional infliction of
178
emotional distress tort that is primarily at issue in Snyder. But
suppressing or putting a high price on speech because of its
offensiveness to the majority is exactly what the First Amendment is
179
designed to protect against. So the argument goes.
What this argument misses, however, is the nature of the
intentional infliction of emotional distress tort. It is a tort limited to
situations in which people deliberately use speech as a weapon for
180
inflicting severe emotional harm. The “outrageousness” element is
not an indicator that the tort is designed or used to go after unpopular
views. The outrageousness requirement is to make sure that the
speech is sufficiently egregious that it is not simply something that the
181
majority doesn’t like. The strength of the constitutional suspicion

176. O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 383, 385; see also supra note 169.
177. See Alan K. Chen, Statutory Speech Bubbles, First Amendment Overbreadth, and
Improper Legislative Purpose, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 31, 82 (2003) (characterizing the
framework of First Amendment law as “being as concerned with illicit government purposes as
it is with effects”); Fallon, supra note 169, at 90–102 (arguing that purpose-based tests and their
surrogates play a more central role in constitutional doctrine than has been appreciated,
including in First Amendment doctrine).
178. See David L. Faigman, Reconciling Individual Rights and Government Interests:
Madisonian Principles Versus Supreme Court Practice, 78 VA. L. REV. 1521, 1531 (1992)
(pointing out that the “legitimacy of government power depends also on the purpose behind its
exercise” and that the purpose gets greater scrutiny “the more deeply revered the right”).
179. See supra note 12. But see Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness,
and the Open Texture of Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473, 477–78 (2011) (arguing that the
“outrageousness” standard is a high threshold to meet, and that the intentional infliction of
emotional distress tort is far more cabined than the Court seems to think).
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965). In fact, some commentators have
proposed new torts because intentional infliction is so limited. See, e.g., Richard Delgado,
Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 151–57 (1982) (walking through cases and concluding that courts
generally “have not recognized the gravity of racial insults” in denying many apparently strong
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims).
181. See Zipursky, supra note 179, at 500–04 (explaining how the outrageousness
requirement serves as a judicial screening device to limit liability). Assume, though, that the
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here, we posit, comes from attributing the interest in speechsuppression to the state itself. The state of Maryland, not just a
particular jury deputized by it, wants to protect its citizens from
emotional harm, the argument goes, by suppressing speech.
Attributing this goal to the state, however, is problematic in
many respects. In a case like Snyder, involving a common-law action,
“the state” is at once everywhere and nowhere. It empowers plaintiffs
182
to bring lawsuits. It provides its authority to juries to decide what is
acceptable and what is outrageous. And it, of course, provides a
forum for the highly staged dance of demands for accountability and
183
explanations of conduct to take place. At the same time, the state
has no control over the litigation. Rather, the decision to bring an
action and the subsequent course of the litigation is left entirely in the
hands of the victim.
The state’s alleged motive or purpose in deterring speech plays
an important role, standing alone, in elevating the First Amendment
184
concerns. But what the Supreme Court is also doing here is using
government motive as a way to extrapolate to government effect.
Attributing a suppressionist motive helps to create the assumption
185
that the state law has a suppressionist effect.
Court is right about this danger of juries. If it was only juries that the Court was worried about,
then the First Amendment interests still might not have enough bite. After all, juries are
historically designed to serve as a bulwark against government power, and though this function
has been greatly diminished in the civil context, the mythology around this role of the jury
remains. Cf. Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 1331,
1342–45 (2012) (discussing the lack of contemporary justification for the civil jury on this
ground). The jury is not the agent of government oppression; it is the counterweight to it. See
generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 81–
110 (1998). Amar refers to the “populist and local institution of the jury” as “[t]he dominant
strategy to keep agents of the central government under control.” Id. at 83.
182. Arguably, this context is an example of what Don Herzog has called the “Kerr
principle,” a principle in constitutional adjudication that “bars the state from serving as a
conduit for private parties’ illegitimate preferences.” See Herzog, supra note 171, at 1–2.
183. See MILNER S. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL,
HUMANISTIC VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS 42–63 (1981) (describing trials as a type of theater);
ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 34–72 (1999) (explicating trials as a set of highly
structured linguistic practices where a person “actually ‘performs’ his or her interpretation of
events in a public forum” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
184. See Nelson, supra note 175, at 1856–57 (positing that the outcome of judicial review in
constitutional challenges can frequently “hinge” on the court’s assessment of legislative
purpose: “Was the legislature trying to produce the adverse effects in question, or were those
effects simply incidental to the legislature’s pursuit of some legitimate objective?”).
185. In the course of disagreeing with Jed Rubenfeld’s argument for focusing on legislative
purpose in First Amendment adjudication, Judge Posner acknowledges this role for
governmental purpose.
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The Supreme Court’s “effects” concern in a case like Snyder,
involving a multimillion dollar jury verdict, is with the next speaker. If
someone wanted to voice concerns on public issues in a way that
could be construed as hurtful, even if meant simply to be provocative,
would the speaker be chilled from undertaking such speech? The
answer depends on an empirical question about the degree to which
tort law—specifically “speech torts” such as defamation, privacy, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress—affects people’s
186
187
behavior. We have very little empirical evidence on this question,
but the relatively small number of such claims—and lack of
widespread awareness of claims brought, verdicts achieved, and the
like—suggests that the effect is likely to be minimal. Given the weak
support for the claim that cases like Synder’s suppress speech, why
does the Court remain concerned?
Because, as we have already posited, the Court fears that the
state is trying to suppress speech. By enabling an intentional infliction
of emotional distress tort, the state’s motive—so the conventional
story goes, repeated in all three opinions in Snyder—was to limit (or
188
deter) such speech. If the state is setting up and maintaining an
expensive apparatus—the tort system—for deterring such conduct,
then the Court must assume that the game is worth the candle.
The purpose, even the motives, behind a regulation of expressive activity may indeed
be relevant—to assessing its consequences. We often and rationally infer the probable
consequences of an action from evidence of a desire by the actor to produce them.
People generally don’t undertake a course of action without reason to believe that it
will accomplish their purpose in undertaking it.
Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in First Amendment Analysis, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 737, 745 (2002).
186. Richard Fallon points to Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974),
as examples of cases that rely on “empirical, predictive calculations” in making constitutional
judgments, Fallon, supra note 169, at 63.
187. See Faigman, supra note 178, at 1524–25 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s
questionable practice of incorporating consideration of government interests into the definition
of whether a constitutional right is implicated permits the Court to “avoid answering difficult
empirical questions inherent in government interest analysis”).
188. See supra note 12; Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1222 (2011) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (defining the State’s interest as “protecting its citizens against severe emotional
harm”); id. (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that “most if not all” jurisdictions allow the intentional
infliction of emotional distress tort “[t]o protect against such injury” (quoting Hustler Magazine,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The trial court instructed the jury along these lines as well. See Snyder v. Phelps, 580
F.3d 206, 214–15, 221 (4th Cir. 2009) (reversing a jury instruction on other grounds that read in
part: “The Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment interest in protecting particular
types of speech must be balanced against a state’s interest in protecting its residents from
wrongful injury”), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).

OMAN & SOLOMON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

2/25/2013 12:15 PM

THE COURT’S THEORY OF PRIVATE LAW

1143

Notice, however, that this entire chain of inferences and intuitions
rests on the assumption that the primary goal of state tort law is
regulatory.
B. State Action
The Court’s focus on tort law as a form of state regulation may
also be driven by the nature of the state-action doctrine. In this
Section, we briefly explain why we think this is the case. The stateaction doctrine is the mechanism by which courts determine whether
a particular action ought to receive constitutional scrutiny, and it has
been the site of much contentiousness among courts and scholars
189
since the beginning of the twentieth century. Constitutional rights,
of course, can only be invoked against action fairly attributable to the
state, and so the state-action doctrine seeks to answer this question of
190
proper attribution.
191
Since Shelley v. Kraemer, common-law actions brought by
192
private parties can be deemed state action. Shelley arose from
attempts by private parties to use litigation to uphold racial
segregation. Applying the state-action doctrine to this litigation and
finding it to be state action allowed federal courts to use the
Fourteenth Amendment to dismantle de jure racial apartheid in
193
American housing. Then, in New York Times v. Sullivan, Sullivan
was an individual suing the New York Times for libel arising out of

189. For a sampling of the vast literature, see sources cited in Gillian E. Metzger,
Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1446 nn. 273–74 (2003). For a recent
critique, see Peller & Tushnet, supra note 41, at 789, which argues that the false public-private
distinction that grounds the state-action doctrine makes the doctrine “analytically incoherent.”
190. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (describing the question as
one of “fair attribution” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
191. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
192. See id. at 19–20 (holding that court enforcement of a racial covenant on property was
state action). How far Shelley extends beyond its facts, though, has been much debated. See, e.g.,
Kevin Cole, Federal and State “State Action”: The Undercritical Embrace of a Hypercriticized
Doctrine, 24 GA. L. REV. 327, 352 (1990) (pointing out that the state’s involvement in Shelley
was so minimal that “it is difficult to imagine any case in which state action is not present”);
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional
Meta-Analysis in State Action Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302, 316–17 (1995) (noting that
“Shelley has proven controversial because it could be read to mean that any court involvement
in an essentially private dispute satisfies the state action requirement,” but that it can also be
construed more narrowly).
193. See generally Charles L. Black, Foreword, “State Action,” Equal Protection, and
California’s Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967).
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194

the civil rights struggle in Alabama. And this was the context in
which the First Amendment was first applied to suits among private
195
parties. In a sense Sullivan, decided sixteen years later, was a logical
extension of Shelley.
Since Sullivan, though, the scope of what is considered state
196
action for First Amendment purposes has continued to grow, and it
is worth pausing to consider just how much the factual circumstances
of Sullivan differ from those in Snyder. Snyder is an individual citizen
whose son died at war and was only in the spotlight because the
Westboro Baptist Church decided to show up at his son’s funeral. His
entanglement with the “state” was simply availing himself of the right
of any citizen to bring a civil suit. In contrast, Sullivan basically was
the state; he was an elected city commissioner in Montgomery,
197
Alabama. The lawsuit was a part of a strategy—later documented
by Anthony Lewis and others—to threaten Northern newspapers
that, like the Times, reported on the civil rights movement, in an
198
effort to discourage them from criticizing segregationist policies.
That is to say, it was an effort by elected officials to use the legal
system to suppress future speech.
In contrast to the factual circumstances of Snyder, in which a
private citizen brought an individual lawsuit, consider another First
199
Amendment case, Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., also decided in 2011.
Vermont had passed a law barring the sale (or give-away) of doctors’
prescription records by pharmacies and data miners, unless the
200
doctors gave permission. The prescription records were valuable to

194. Id. at 256.
195. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964). The Court explained:
Although this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have
applied a state rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on
their constitutional freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law has
been applied in a civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by
statute. The test is not the form in which state power has been applied but, whatever
the form, whether such power has in fact been exercised.
Id. (citation omitted).
196. See Developments in the Law—State Action and the Public/Private Distinction, 123
HARV. L. REV. 1248, 1255–66 (2010) (providing an analytic summary of the evolution of the
state-action doctrine).
197. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256. Compare this with someone like Jerry Falwell, who is a public
figure but not a government official. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 49 (1988).
198. See generally LEWIS, supra note 128.
199. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011).
200. An Act of Mar. 5, 2008, No. 89, 2008 Vt. Acts & Resolves 4 (codified as amended at
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 4631 (West (2012).
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companies that were marketing pharmaceuticals to doctors and their
201
patients. So here we have the state of Vermont, speaking through its
legislature, telling companies not to do certain activities within its
borders, at least without consent. This is clearly state action in a way
that Snyder’s private lawsuit is not.
The problem with the state-action doctrine is that it does not
take into account the differences between the type and extent of state
202
involvement in the Snyder and Sorrell cases. The state-action
203
doctrine is unitary: either something is state action, or it is not. If it
is, then full-blown constitutional scrutiny applies; if it is not, then no
constitutional scrutiny applies. But the concerns underlying the First
Amendment are not necessarily as salient in cases in which a private
party brings a lawsuit, as opposed to those in which a state legislature
passes a statute, as in Sorrell, or a public official either uses his
authority or the courts, as in Sullivan. This is because in providing
recourse through the private law, the state is not primarily regulating
or punishing speech, as opposed to the effort by Vermont to suppress
a certain class of commercial expression.
The effect of this unitary aspect of the state-action doctrine is to
exacerbate the tendency to view the common law as an arm of state
regulation. After all, regulation is what the state does in the twenty204
first century. So if it is indeed the state acting, then that is what it
must be doing: regulating conduct. Surely the twenty-first-century
205
state does not provide fora for slightly more civilized duels.
Moreover, the acceptance of the “everything is state action” status
quo has led the doctrine to bleed over far beyond the specific
question that it is designed to answer: whether the government is

201. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2659–60.
202. This is of course just one problem with the much-criticized doctrine. For another kind
of critique, see Michael L. Wells, Identifying State Actors in Constitutional Litigation: Reviving
the Role of Substantive Context, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 99, 120–25 (2004), which argues that the
doctrine relies too much on state involvement, and should take account of “substantive context”
as well as the values implicated by the particular constitutional rights, id. at 120–25.
203. E.g., John Fee, The Formal State Action Doctrine and Free Speech Analysis, 83 N.C. L.
REV. 569, 578 (2005) (“[T]he state action issue presents an all-or-nothing question. Either there
is state action, in which case the ultimate act is attributed to the government, or there is no state
action, and the case is dismissed. No middle ground is available.”).
204. See EDWARD L. RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR
THE MODERN STATE 204 (2005) (suggesting that “policy and implementation”—the basic tools
of regulation—“constitute the full range of governmental action in a modern state”).
205. But see Oman, supra note 4, at 45–49 (exploring the historical relationship between
litigation and dueling).
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sufficiently involved in the challenged action such that constitutional
206
protections apply at all. One can agree that common-law actions
and enforcement implicate “the state” such that they may be subject
to challenge under the Constitution on the one hand, without
committing to the view that the animating purpose or function of the
207
common law is state regulation.
A defender of the Court can respond that it is true that the
common law can be characterized, perhaps is even best characterized,
as serving an interest in redress. Perhaps that is the underlying
purpose of private law, at least tort law. But that does not mean that
tort law cannot also have the effect of putting a price on certain
208
activity so as (whether intentionally or otherwise) to discourage it.
State-provided fora where lawsuits can result in the payment of
money damages can do that.
If private law has the effect of discouraging speech by putting a
price on it (and in Snyder, it turned out to be a pretty high one, $5
209
million), then courts must obey the stricture of the Bill of Rights,
according to this view. The federal interest simply trumps. In our
view, consistent with Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Snyder, this is
both inconsistent with the thrust of First Amendment doctrine and
accords the federal constitutional interest too much weight. Rather,
as we suggest in Part IV, freedom of speech should be protected in
ways that do not eliminate any recourse by victims against those that
wrong them. The private-law baby ought not to be thrown out with
the regulatory bath water.
C. Instrumentalism’s Influence
Besides the unitary state-action requirement, the instrumentalist
view of private law also gives the state a greater role than it actually
has in a case like Snyder. According to the instrumentalist view,
206. See supra note 190.
207. E.g., Herzog, supra note 171, at 22–23. In this sense, the state-action doctrine is less
about “attribution” or causation, and more about responsibility—the state cannot be responsible
for the suppression of speech, even if it is not doing the suppressing itself, or making the tort
available for the purpose of suppression.
208. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) (“The fear of damage awards
under a rule such as that invoked by the Alabama courts here may be markedly more inhibiting
than the fear of prosecution under a criminal statute.”).
209. The original jury verdict was actually $10.9 million, made up of $2.9 million in
compensatory damages and $8 million in punitive damages, but the amount was reduced by the
trial court to a total of $5 million by decreasing the punitive award. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F.
Supp. 2d 567 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
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particularly the law-and-economics variant, the plaintiff is a private
attorney general, acting on behalf of the government to deter
210
undesirable behavior. But this imposes a particular theoretical
construct on facts that are unlikely to fit it. The public record contains
little on Snyder’s motives for bringing the lawsuit, but it seems most
plausible that he was acting on behalf of himself and his deceased son,
211
not the state of Maryland. Certainly, the law of Maryland did not
treat Snyder’s cause of action as a mere extension of its regulatory
aims. Rather, his standing to sue depended decisively on his status as
a victim of the Westboro Baptist Church’s actions, and under
Maryland law the right of action against Phelps was a piece of
212
personal property that belonged exclusively to Synder.
Doctrinally, in the cases on the conflict between the First
Amendment and speech torts, it matters whether plaintiffs like
213
Snyder are “public figures” or not. Snyder and his son were private
figures, unlike Jerry Falwell, the plaintiff in the Supreme Court’s only
other case involving intentional infliction of emotional distress and
210. For example, some scholars have argued that speech torts are an area of civil liability
for which First Amendment protection ought to be at its highest because the government’s use
of its power is “duty-defining.” E.g., Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free
Speech and Civil Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650, 1686 (2009). According to this view,
private law is used here as “a way for the government to regulate social conduct by defining the
duties and having private parties serve as civil ‘prosecutors’ to enforce them.” Id. This is
precisely the view that we think has led the doctrine astray.
211. See Zipursky, supra note 179, at 505 (“[T]he plaintiff Snyder was not acting as a private
attorney general of Maryland demanding that some criminal or regulatory fine be handed out;
Snyder was suing for a wrong to himself.”).
212. See, e.g., Jones v. Prince George’s Cnty., 835 A.2d 632, 644 (Md. 2003) (“Under
Maryland common law, standing to bring a judicial action generally depends on whether one is
‘aggrieved,’ which means whether a plaintiff has ‘an interest such that he [or she] is personally
and specifically affected in a way different from . . . the public generally.’” (alterations in
original) (quoting Sugarloaf Citizens’ Ass’n v. Dep’t of Env’t, 686 A.2d 605, 614 (Md. 1996))
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Summers v. Freishtat, 335 A.2d 89, 92 (Md. 1975) (“[T]he
modern rule, as we have heretofore pointed out, is that a chose in action in tort is generally
assignable, in the absence of a statutory prohibition, if it is a right which would survive the
assignor and could be enforced by his personal representative.”); Long Green Valley Ass’n v.
Bellevale Farms, Inc., 46 A.3d 473, 483 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012) (“Standing rests on ‘a legal
interest such as . . . one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which
confers a privilege.’” (quoting Comm. for Responsible Dev. on 25th St. v. Mayor of Baltimore,
767 A.2d 906, 912 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also
Roberts v. Total Heath Care, Inc., 709 A.2d 142, 153 (Md. 1998) (citing Summers v. Freishtat,
335 A.2d 89 (Md. 1975), as setting the standard for assignability of choses in action).
213. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974); see also Mark Strasser,
Funeral Protests, Privacy, and the Constitution: What Is Next After Phelps?, 61 AM. U. L. REV.
279, 293–96 (2011) (arguing that Snyder’s ignoring of this issue does not reflect the current state
of First Amendment law).
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214

the First Amendment, Hustler. But Justice Roberts’s opinion
ignores entirely this issue, despite the fact that it was the ground on
which the district court ruled that the verdict should stand.
Under an instrumentalist view of private law, how public a figure
the plaintiff is ought not to matter at all. In bringing the lawsuit, the
plaintiff becomes an agent of the state. But the reason Snyder’s
private-ness or public-ness does matter in First Amendment doctrine,
contra instrumentalism, is that it affects his entitlement to recourse.
That is to say, even if Richard Jewell, the Atlanta security guard
suspected of bombing the Olympics in 1996, had been defamed, as he
claimed in his lawsuit, he was not entitled to complain because he had
215
“thrust himself to the forefront” of public life. This is consistent
with a kind of “consensual waiver” approach to First Amendment
216
doctrine. It also accords with well-established tort doctrines like the
217
assumption of risk.
Below we outline three other ways that an instrumental view
obscures important features of private law in a case like Snyder’s.
Specifically, the instrumental approach ignores the plaintiff’s agency,
the state interest in redress, and the degree to which compensation is
a form of justice.
1. Ignoring Plaintiffs’ Agency. One of the results of the Court’s
emphasis on state tort law as a form of public regulation is to render
the agency of the plaintiff in bringing the lawsuit largely invisible.
One of the core features of the law of private wrongs is that nothing
218
happens unless a wronged plaintiff chooses to sue. The machinery

214. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (“Respondent would have
us find that a State’s interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is sufficient to
deny First Amendment protection to speech that is patently offensive and is intended to inflict
emotional injury, even when that speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating
actual facts about the public figure involved. This we decline to do.”).
215. Atl. Journal-Constitution v. Jewell, 555 S.E.2d 175, 182–85 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
216. See Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs, supra note 4, at 1767–68 (explaining the public-figure
doctrine as a variant of assumption of risk).
217. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A (1965) (“A plaintiff who voluntarily
assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the defendant cannot
recover for such harm.”); id. § 496A cmt. c(2) (“[Assumption of risk means] that the plaintiff
has entered voluntarily into some relation with the defendant which he knows to involve the
risk, and so is regarded as tacitly or impliedly agreeing to relieve the defendant of responsibility,
and to take his own chances. . . . [T]he legal result is that the defendant is relieved of his duty to
the plaintiff.”).
218. See Oman, supra note 4, at 39 (“[T]he private law empowers plaintiffs to act against
defendants. Plaintiffs may choose to bring suit against tortfeasors and contract breachers, but
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of the law will remain inert unless a private party brings an action.
Furthermore, the private party bringing the lawsuit must be a victim
of the defendant’s action. He must have suffered a wrong of some
sort. He is thus in a different position than a public prosecutor or
someone such as a qui tam relator under federal whistleblower
statutes who need not be a victim of the defendant’s wrongdoing to
220
sue. Rather, the law of torts empowers victims to act against those
who have wronged them.
When tort law is seen purely as a matter of safety regulation or
loss spreading, the way in which tort law empowers plaintiffs becomes
221
at best an idiosyncratic system of private enforcement. On this view,
the regulatory ideal would be for an omniscient and omnicompetent
state to monitor the behavior of all citizens and to impose sanctions
222
on those who frustrate the supposed regulatory goals of tort law.
Given the limitations in terms of resources and information that the
state faces, however, this ideal is not possible. The second-best
solution is to create private rights of action and then give plaintiffs an
223
incentive to sue. Private suits thus serve to vindicate public policy.
In short, private litigation is just a pragmatic, second-best solution in
the face of limitations on the state’s reach. Whatever the merits of this
argument, however, it completely fails to make sense of certain
ubiquitous, core features of the law of torts.
But if tort actions are a second-best means of controlling
behavior, it makes little sense to confine the right of action to victims.

the law does not require that they do so. Rather, it waits entirely on the plaintiff’s decision to
sue. Until she brings an action, nothing happens.”).
219. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 65, at 738–39.
220. See Oman, supra note 4, at 39 (explaining that under “disaggregated enforcement
mechanisms,” such as qui tam actions, “the plaintiff need not be a victim of the defendant’s
wrongdoing but may sue as a way of enforcing public policy merely on the basis of
information”).
221. See Jane Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursky’s Civil Recourse Theory, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1529, 1538 (2006) (“[C]ivil recourse theory does not fall into the trap of
depending on the assertion of some ‘goal’ of tort law such as ‘compensation’ or ‘deterrence’ or
‘loss-spreading.’”).
222. See John C.P. Goldberg, Tort in Three Dimensions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 321, 325–26 (2011)
(ascribing such a view to mid-twentieth century scholars such as Leon Green and William
Prosser—that tort would be “a branch of the emergent administrative state in which regulations
directed toward certain kinds of influential actors . . . would be crafted primarily by jurors and
judges on a case-by-case basis”).
223. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 136 (arguing that a norm that encourages
victims to seek redress is valuable because “deterrence is undermined when victims fail to
respond”).
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Remember, according to the second-best argument, private litigation
is a response to finite government resources and limited government
224
information. This, however, would imply that anyone with resources
and information should be allowed to bring a suit to vindicate the
225
government’s regulatory interests. Tort law, by confining the right
of action to victims, would seem to undermine the very regulatory
goals that it is supposedly pursuing. A more plausible view is that
empowering victims is not a second- or even third-best solution to
problems of enforcement. Rather, empowering victims by giving them
the agency to act against their wrongdoers is itself a primary value of
226
private law. On this view, tort law may be a poor system of risk
227
Rather, there is an
regulation, but that is not its purpose.
independent normative value in giving victims recourse against
228
tortfeasors.
One way of thinking about this value is suggested by the writing
229
of John Rawls. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that there are
certain preconditions for a good life that hold true regardless of one’s

224. See id. (“[V]ictims are often in the best position to know when and how much they have
been injured as well as the identity of injurers.”).
225. Indeed, some scholars have proposed exactly this in the context of tort law. See, e.g.,
Dan Markel, Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 239, 279–86 (2009) (explicating the appeal of this “private attorneys general”
model in cases where retributive justice against wrongdoers is warranted, but victims decline to
sue).
226. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 68, at 972 (arguing that it is “legitimate and
useful” for the state to “afford the victims of certain wrongs an avenue of recourse against those
who have wronged them,” and referring to civil recourse as “what the state delivers” by having
tort law).
227. Certain features of tort law are plausibly seen as designed to regulate risk, with punitive
damages being one example. See, e.g., Mathias v. Accor Econ. Lodging, Inc., 347 F.3d 672, 677–
78 (7th Cir. 2003). But even punitive damages might fit more comfortably into a wrongs-andredress model of tort law. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 68, at 962 (“[T]here is nothing
remotely surprising about the idea that a victim of a particularly malicious or willful wrong
would be entitled to ask the court for permission to be punitive in her response to the
defendant.”); Markel, supra note 225, at 249–50 (“[P]unitive damages should be understood as
‘quasi-criminal’ ‘private fines’ designed to punish and deter the misconduct at issue.” (quoting
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001))); Anthony J.
Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA L. REV. 957, 1025 (2007) (“The
reason that informs the subjective aspect of punitive damages is the plaintiff’s rational exercise
of her power to seek redress appropriate to the wrong she suffered.”).
228. See Oman, supra note 4, at 40 (“Recourse theorists insist there is some distinctive
normative goal that is vindicated by giving citizens the ability to proceed in court against those
that have wronged them.”).
229. RAWLS, supra note 51.
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Because such
ultimate beliefs about the shape of that life.
preconditions do not hinge on controversial beliefs about the good or
moral life but are necessary for virtually every conception of such a
231
life, they become a legitimate object for a liberal state. Among these
preconditions, Rawls names self-respect, the notion that the life one is
232
pursuing is valuable and worth pursuing. Thus far the claim strikes
us as plausible. Rawls, however, tends to view self-respect as a good
distributed by a beneficent social planner. It becomes a right that the
individual claims, like the right to vote or perhaps the right to a
233
welfare benefit. What this formulation misses is the role of agency
234
in generating self-respect.
The idea of honor provides a way of thinking about the role of
agency. Think of a tort as an act of humiliation, a way in which the
tortfeasor fails to show due concern to the victim. How does one
recover one’s honor? If the person who humiliates you is punished,
one might believe that justice has been done, that the injured person
has received his due reward. Yet just punishment is not the same
235
thing as the restoration of lost honor—of lost self-respect.
Here it would seem that epic poetry provides a more insightful
236
237
account of self-respect than John Rawls. In The Iliad, The Aeneid,
238
or Beowulf, a beneficent king does not dispense honor. To be sure,
all of these stories are set within hierarchical societies in which
differing levels of honor are attached to certain kinds of statuses—
king, knight, hero, slave, and so on. This status-based honor, however,
239
is not the honor that drives the plot. Rather the self-respect gained
by Achilles, Aeneas, and Beowulf comes from their actions. In the

230. Id. at 155. One of us first used Rawls in this context in Oman, supra note 4, at 55–56
(citing JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, at 155–56 (rev. ed. 1999)).
231. See RAWLS, supra note 51, at 178–82 (discussing the role of self-respect in the
deliberations of agents in the original position).
232. See id. at 178 (“Self-respect is not so much a part of any rational plan of life as the sense
that one’s plan is worth carrying out.”).
233. See SHARON R. KRAUSE, LIBERALISM WITH HONOR 18 (2002) (“Thus self-esteem is a
good to be distributed, according to Rawls, and in a just society it will be distributed equally.”).
234. Oman, supra note 4, at 56.
235. Id. at 62–63.
236. HOMER, THE ILIAD (Robert Fagles trans., Viking Penguin 1990) (n.d.).
237. VERGIL, THE AENEID (Sarah Ruden trans., Yale Univ. Press 2008) (19 B.C.E.).
238. BEOWULF AND OTHER ENGLISH POEMS (Craig Williamson ed. & trans., Univ. of Pa.
Press 2011).
239. See Oman, supra note 4, at 56 (“In The Iliad, honor is not ultimately dispensed by the
gods, but is gained by heroic actions.”).
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face of humiliation, taking action against those who have humiliated
240
them restores their self-respect.
For the heroes of the epic poems, agency against wrongdoers
took the form of violent self-help. Fortunately, the modern state has
been relatively successful at suppressing private violence and other
forms of serious private aggression. We can call those who wrong us
names, but we cannot act directly against their persons or their
property. This leaves the modern victim with relatively few options
for acting against his wrongdoer. Even an act of forgiveness or
magnanimity loses much of its meaning in a world in which the
forbearance of the victim has little impact on the wrongdoer. In short,
there is a sense in which the success of Leviathan in suppressing the
Hobbesian war of “all against all” is too successful, leaving
241
wrongdoers more or less invulnerable to attack by their victim.
Private law responds to this problem by creating “liability.”
Though the word is ubiquitous, its original meaning is seldom fully
242
remembered. To be liable is to be vulnerable. To be liable to attack
means that one is vulnerable to attack. It does not mean that the
attack will actually occur. That is left to the choice of the attacker.
243
Tort law defines wrongs, but it does not suppress those wrongs.
Rather, it makes the wrongdoer vulnerable to recourse by the
244
victim.
This recourse, however, is sharply limited. It is civil recourse.
Nevertheless it avoids the problem of the humiliated and powerless
245
victim that is created by the complete suppression of self-help. In
effect we solve the problem of Leviathan’s overeffectiveness by
reintroducing the war of all against all into society, albeit in a very

240. See, e.g., HOMER, supra note 236, at 421 (“Fight like men, my friends . . . ! [Patroclus
urges.] Now we must win high honor for Peleus’ royal son . . . !”).
241. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN passim (Everyman’s Library 1983) (1651).
242. See Jason M. Solomon, Civil Recourse as Social Equality, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 243,
249–50 (2011) (relating this meaning of “vulnerable” to the vulnerability that accompanies
physical embodiment and is often taken advantage of in a situation resulting in tortiously caused
harm).
243. See Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 65, at 90 (“The tort law defines
the ways in which we wrong one another . . . .”).
244. Id.
245. See id. at 85 (referring to the law of civil recourse as allowing society to “avoid[] the
mayhem and crudeness of vengeful private retribution, but without the unfairness of leaving
individuals powerless against invasions of their rights”).
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stylized form that sharply limits the scope of conflict. Nevertheless,
litigation is a form of conflict, a way in which a victim chooses—or
247
not—to act against her victimizer. The danger of a decision such as
Snyder is that it renders the victim of aggression utterly powerless.
The victim is deprived by the power of Leviathan from exercising
self-help to hold the aggressor accountable. At the same time, by in
effect eliminating the victim’s cause of action against a tortfeasor,
Snyder also eliminates the possibility of acting in the courts. Above
and beyond any evil caused by inefficient levels of deterrence or
losses left uncompensated, the Court in Synder made it impossible for
the victim to reassert his worth and honor through action in the face
of aggression.
Another way of thinking about the value of agency is in terms of
moral address. This refers to the nature of the implicit authority of a
speaker making normative arguments or claims. The regulatory vision
248
of the law sees its obligations primarily in the third person. The
impersonal demands of the law are ideally enforced by the
impersonal force of the state. The law does not involve the victim
249
addressing the tortfeasor and demanding redress. At best, on the
regulatory view, the state addresses itself to the tortfeasor through
the person of the victim, who is reduced to an instrument of the
state’s policy.
What the regulatory vision of the law denies is the idea that the
victim himself has a right to address the tortfeasor and make demands

246. Cf. HOBBES, supra note 241, at 64 (“[D]uring the time men live without a common
Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a
warre, as is of every man against every man.”).
247. See Oman, supra note 4, at 63–64 (“Suing someone is more than simply a petition for
redress. It is an act of aggression by the plaintiff against the wrongdoer. Likewise the process of
litigation is a battle and a struggle.”).
248. In moral philosophy, such obligations are also referred to as “state-of-the-worldregarding.” STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT,
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 5 (2006). That is, the obligation exists because the world would be a
better place if it were so, not because of any reason one might have for having such an
obligation (first-person), or because of anything owed to another (second-person). See id. at 5–6
(citing G.E.MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA (1993)).
249. An alternative view of the law, consistent with what we describe here and also based in
significant part on Stephen Darwall’s work, is presented in Robin Bradley Kar, The Second
Person Standpoint and the Law 14–19 (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 10-19, 2010), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1589791 (using Darwall’s work to argue
that “legal obligations purport to have a special form of authority, which is best understood as
involving either implicit or explicit interpersonal demands”).
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on him as a result of his wrongdoing. It is the difference between
saying, “One should not step on the feet of others” and saying, “Hey
251
you! Get off my foot.” The second form of address acknowledges
the moral authority that a victim acquires over a wrongdoer, an
authority that gives the victim the right to make demands on the
person who has victimized him.
Bringing a lawsuit, then, is a way for an individual to demand
answers or accountability from one who has wronged him. In
providing a forum for such practices, the state reinforces a particular
252
kind of social equality that is relational. It underscores that no
individual’s interests are above another’s simply because of status or
253
wealth. It underscores that we all have obligations to one another,
254
and are answerable for these obligations. And by empowering
victims to demand accountability, the state underscores each
individual’s moral authority and personal agency.
2. The Missing State Interest in Redress. Acknowledging the
importance of empowering victims and providing a legal mechanism
for them to exercise agency against their victimizers have implications
for how one conceptualizes the state interest in private-law cases.
When private law is seen as a regulatory enterprise, the state interest
255
centers on controlling the behavior of the defendant. For example,
the purpose of libel law becomes the suppression of libelous speech.
The purpose of products-liability law becomes the elimination of
defective products. And so on.
Placing the agency of the plaintiff in the foreground of the
discussion of tort law, however, recasts the state interest. Although
the state may be interested in suppressing certain kinds of wrongs
250. See Solomon, Equal Accountability, supra note 4, at 1810 (“From the state’s
perspective, by establishing a system whereby individuals can hold those who have wronged
them legally accountable, the state underscores the moral accountability we have toward one
another as well. The state does this simply by establishing the system and making it available.”).
251. This example is drawn from DARWALL, supra note 248, at 5–6.
252. See Solomon, supra note 242, at 256 (“By empowering individuals with the right to
recourse, the state affirms relational equality in giving individuals the authority to make
demands of others and also the obligation to respond to those demands.”).
253. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 607–08 (articulating tort law’s role in promoting and
maintaining a “nonhierarchical conception of social ordering”).
254. See Solomon, Equal Accountability, supra note 4, at 1807–11 (describing this as a
“moral community of equals who are mutually accountable”).
255. See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 34, at 86 & n.2 (pointing first to the “incentives it
creates for potential injurers” as a way to evaluate tort law, and acknowledging in a footnote
that the influence on potential victims’ behavior is another “important effect”).
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that give rise to torts, this is not the primary purpose of tort law
256
itself. Rather, tort law, with its plaintiff- and victim-centered
structure, advances the state’s interest in providing citizens with
257
recourse against those that have harmed them. What is important is
not ensuring that wrongs do not happen but ensuring that if wrongs
do happen the victim is not left powerless to act against the
258
wrongdoer. There is ample evidence that providing civil recourse is
an interest that is deeply embedded in state law.
Snyder sued Phelps under the Maryland tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress. Part of the state’s interest in having
such a tort could be the deterrent effect that the prospect of liability
might have on those such as Phelps, who set out to terrorize grieving
families.
One can imagine, for example, the Maryland state legislature
holding hearings on the amount of emotional distress that individuals
are suffering within its borders. One can imagine a blue-ribbon report
documenting this phenomenon, labeling it a problem, and making
recommendations about what to do. One of those recommendations
might be the passage of a law providing for a private right of action
for individuals to bring tort claims for emotional distress inflicted on
them, and one can even imagine a purpose or preamble section of the
statute that specifically says that this is the state’s motive in passing
the law and including the private right of action: to reduce or deter or
suppress this kind of conduct, including speech. Indeed, statutes
providing individuals with private rights of action for wrongs done to
259
them are quite common in state and federal law. If this were the
backdrop to Snyder’s lawsuit, then the Supreme Court’s view of the
lawsuit as a regulatory mechanism would make perfect sense.
But Maryland’s law at issue here—the common-law tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress—arose quite differently. It
arose in a context in which individuals came into court seeking
256. See Zipursky, supra note 179, at 478 (“Tort law, unlike criminal law or regulation, is not
a series of general prohibitions or restrictions promulgated and then enforced by the state.”).
257. Id. at 519.
258. Almost in passing, at the end of his Snyder dissent, Justice Alito acknowledges this
value of a tort claim: “Respondents’ outrageous conduct caused petitioner great injury, and the
Court now compounds that injury by depriving petitioner of a judgment that acknowledges the
wrong he suffered.” Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1229 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
259. In state law, a wave of recent consumer fraud statutes provides perhaps the best
examples. See Alexandra B. Klass, Tort Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1501, 1521–25 (2009) (reviewing these developments).
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redress for wrongs done to them. Indeed, Maryland has a deeply
rooted interest in providing its citizens with the power to act against
those who wrongfully harm them. The Maryland constitution’s
Declaration of Rights states
[t]hat every man, for any injury done to him in his person or
property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law of the
Land, and ought to have justice and right, freely without sale, fully
without any denial, and speedily without delay, according to the Law
261
of the Land.

Elsewhere the Declaration states “[t]hat the Inhabitants of Maryland
are entitled to the Common Law of England, and the trial by Jury,
262
according to the course of that Law.”
What is striking about these constitutional provisions is that
rather than entitling the citizens of Maryland to some absolute
protection of their persons and property, they confer upon citizens
263
rights of redress, a “remedy by the course of the Law.” Far from
being an anomaly, the Maryland constitution’s emphasis on the right
to a law of redress for private wrongs represents a powerful strand
running through American law. Most states have “open courts”
provisions in their state constitutions guaranteeing to citizens access
264
to the courts for the redress of private wrongs. Though the way in
265
which these provisions are phrased varies from state to state, they
all represent private recourse as a state interest of sufficient
importance to be enshrined in the state’s fundamental law.
The notion that members of the community have a basic right of
access to civil justice against those who have wronged them is also
deeply embedded in the common-law tradition from which our legal
266
system emerged. Beginning in the seventeenth century, classical
common-law theorists such as Coke, Hale, and Selden began

260. Harris v. Jones, 380 A.2d 611, 611–17 (Md. 1977). See supra text accompanying notes
156–166.
261. MD. CONST. art. 19.
262. Id. art. 5(a). This provision of the state constitution acts as Maryland’s reception statute
for the common law.
263. Id. art. 19.
264. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 560–62 & n.177 (describing the insertion of such rights
into early state constitutions).
265. See David Schuman, The Right to a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1197, 1201 n.25 (1992)
(listing state constitutional provisions providing for free and open courts).
266. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 549 (locating these ideas in Blackstone’s Commentaries,
itself a synthesis of common-law and social-contract theories).
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articulating a theory of “the ancient constitution” that placed
267
significant limitations on royal prerogatives. Although the ancient
constitution was little more than a historical myth, it did mark an
important set of arguments about the legal institutions to which
268
subjects were entitled. A key element in this theory was the right to
269
redress of private grievances. Hence, for example, though the king
had considerable power to grant special exemptions from the law, the
classical common-law theorists insisted that he could not do so in a
way that deprived a wronged subject of recourse against those who
270
had committed private wrongs against them. These ideas were then
transmitted via Blackstone and social-contract theorists to America,
where they formed the basis for the tradition of open-courts
271
provisions in state constitutions guaranteeing access to civil justice.
Based on these sources, Professor John Goldberg has gone so far
as to argue that there is a right to a law for the redress of wrongs that
emerges from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
272
and the structure of the federal Constitution.
According to
Goldberg, such a right is justified by the historical link between due
process and redress for wrongs and is consistent with the structure of
273
many of the Court’s decisions construing the Due Process Clause.
Without taking a position on the ultimate merits of Goldberg’s
constitutional claim, however, we note that it is not necessary to go so
far to appreciate the importance of redress.
Even if the Constitution does not require a law for the redress of
wrongs, providing such a law surely counts as an important state
interest, one that is likely to be “so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” that goes
267. See id. at 532–37 (describing the components of the “ancient constitution”).
268. For discussions of the “ancient constitution,” see generally GLENN BURGESS, THE
POLITICS OF THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH POLITICAL
THOUGHT, 1603–1642 (1992); J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE
FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
(1987); and JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE ORIGINS OF ANGLOAMERICAN LIBERTY (2005).
269. Goldberg, supra note 65, at 537–39.
270. See id. (discussing limits on the “dispensing power” of the king).
271. See supra note 265. Most of these provisions assert that the courts must be open
“freely” and “without purchase.” See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. 1, § 12. Others state that courts must
be available to redress harms to “property or character.” See, e.g., MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
272. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 583–96 (referring to this as a “structural due process”
right).
273. See id. at 564–80 (analyzing Supreme Court doctrines that consider due process limits
on remedies).
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to the “very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty,” and which is
274
contained within the written constitutions of many states. It is this
interest in a law that empowers victims to seek redress against those
who have wronged them—rather than suppressing some particular
form of behavior—that is largely missing from the way in which the
275
Supreme Court conceptualizes the states’ interest in tort law.
3. Compensation as Social Insurance or Pricing Mechanism. The
instrumentalist view of private law sees compensation or damages as
a mechanism either of social insurance for accidental harm, or as a
276
pricing mechanism for risky activity. This view is reflected in the
contemporary Court’s discussion of compensation like the $5 million
jury verdict at issue in Snyder. But there is an alternative view with
deeper historical and cultural roots: namely, that compensation is a
means of making amends or paying back debt.
As Professor William Miller has emphasized, money has always,
across cultures and eras, been a substitute for literally taking the
277
other person’s eye when he takes yours. If you bring a civil lawsuit
against one you think has wronged you, you are not seeking
vengeance, that is, seeking to inflict pain on another like that which
had been inflicted on you. Instead, you are making a demand to settle
278
a moral accounting that stems from the wrong done to you. Money
happens to be the vehicle for settling such accounts.

274. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)) (internal quotation mark omitted), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969).
275. See Ronen Perry, Empowerment and Tort Law, 76 TENN. L. REV. 959, 979–80 (2009)
(“Civil litigation may serve to empower victims in several ways.”); Zipursky, Civil Recourse,
supra note 65, at 735 (“By recognizing a legal right of action against a tortfeasor, our system
respects the principle that the plaintiff is entitled to act against one who has legally wronged him
or her.”).
276. Gerald F. Gaus, Does Compensation Restore Equality?, in COMPENSATORY JUSTICE:
NOMOS XXXIII, at 45, 60–62 (John W. Chapman ed., 1991).
277. See WILLIAM IAN MILLER, EYE FOR AN EYE 25 (2006) (“The fact is that revenge in
blood invariably coexisted with means of paying off the avenger by transfers of property or
money-like substances in lieu of blood. . . . Revenge was compensation using blood, not instead
of money, but as a kind of money.”).
278. See Jules L. Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 421,
426 (1982) (“First, one might argue from the principle of retributive justice for the imposition of
liability of faulty injurers. Such an argument would hold that wrongdoing, whether or not it
secures personal gain, is sinful and ought to be punished or sanctioned. Imposing liability in
torts is a way of sanctioning mischief. Therefore liability is imposed on the faulty injurer not to
rectify his gain—of which there may be none—but to penalize his moral wrong.”).
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Though the compensation involved in tort cases can be seen as
the equivalent of a payment from a “no-fault” government-provided
fund for accidental injury, such as that from the 9/11 fund for victims’
279
families or the system governing accidental injury in New Zealand,
it is of a different character. There is normative significance in the fact
that the demand for compensation is made to the wrongdoer, not the
government, and that the demand for justice is made by the victim
280
rather than the state, as it is in criminal law. These characteristics of
tort law highlight the normative connection between the “doer and
281
the sufferer,” as Aristotle described it, and put this particular kind
of cash payment on a different plane than a Social Security check, for
example.
Moreover, though the social insurance mechanism is certainly
282
one function that tort compensation serves, it is not clear how much
tort compensation serves this function. Though economic damages
for wage loss and medical bills are certainly a significant part of tort
compensation, they are not all. Noneconomic—or pain and
suffering—damages also make up a major segment of tort damages,
283
although caps on such damages may be changing that. In Snyder’s
lawsuit, for example, the amount of “economic” damages—primarily
279. See generally Craig Brown, Deterrence in Tort and No-Fault: The New Zealand
Experience, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 976, 982–83 (1985) (describing New Zealand’s no-fault Accident
Compensation Act 2001).
280. See Zipursky, Civil Recourse, supra note 65, at 699 (“The state provides the plaintiff
with a right of action against the defendant for damages or other relief only if the defendant has
wronged the plaintiff in a manner specified by tort law. In permitting and empowering plaintiffs
to act against those who have wronged them, the state is not relying upon the idea that a
defendant has a pre-existing duty of repair. Instead, it is relying on the principle that plaintiffs
who have been wronged are entitled to some avenue of civil recourse against the tortfeasor who
wronged them.”).
281. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 125 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett
Publ’g Co. 1985) (c. 384 B.C.E.).
282. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private Insurance, Social Insurance, and
Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness and Injury, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
75, 88 (1993) (“In short, the conventional picture of the tort system as a corrective justice and
deterrence regime is overly simple. Tort liability is also a forced-insurance arrangement, under
which potential victims are required to insure themselves against the risk of suffering injury
from the provision of health care or the sale of a product. In this respect, at least, tort law
constitutes a disguised insurance program that resembles some of the programs that more
explicitly perform this function.”).
283. See, e.g., CHAMALLAS & WRIGGINS, supra note 159, at 170–82 (criticizing such caps as
having a disproportionate impact on women, children, the elderly, and minorities); 3 DAN B.
DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 479, at 8 (2d ed. 2011)
(stating that plaintiffs may recover for “virtually any form of conscious suffering, both
emotional and physical.”).

OMAN & SOLOMON IN PRINTER PROOF (DO NOT DELETE)

1160

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

2/25/2013 12:15 PM

[Vol. 62:1109

for psychological counseling—was a miniscule percentage of the
284
overall verdict.
There is a form of justice involved in tort law. We can call it
individual justice, corrective justice, or, perhaps, equal accountability.
We can even see it as a way of redeeming honor or underscoring
dignity—when the wrongdoer has to pay money to the victim, that
payment shows that the victim is someone who must be dealt with,
who cannot be ignored with a flick of the hand. This is the kind of
justice instantiated in the state constitutions that mention a right to
redress, and discussed by tort scholars as civil recourse theory—the
right to confront one who has wronged you. The payment of damages
285
can be seen as settling a moral debt, or making amends.
This is a different kind of justice than the distributive justice
implicated by social insurance. Social insurance is at root a way of
achieving greater equality of misfortune or, put differently, a way of
286
evening out, or cushioning people from, the burden of risk. For
287
example, when Congress created a vaccine-compensation program,
it achieved this kind of justice by ensuring a “cushion” of sorts for
individuals who happen to have the misfortune of taking particular
vaccines at a particular point in time.
But the Court too often seems to assume this kind of distributive
justice is at issue, rather than individual or corrective justice (or the
288
state interest in redress). Snyder claimed that Phelps had harmed
him in a particular way—by knowingly acting and, yes, speaking in
such a way as to cause him severe emotional harm—and that Phelps
had thereby treated him as less than human. To use the familiar
Kantian terms, Phelps treated Snyder as a means to another’s end.
Snyder’s ceremonial grieving was simply a backdrop for Phelps’s
main event, speaking to the world about the moral rot that he
believed existed in the United States. And so for a court to order the
284. Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 586–89 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th
Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
285. See Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse, supra note 65, at 83–84 (“The idea of
recourse is arguably in the same conceptual family as the retributive notion of an eye for an eye,
and an idea of recourse lies behind the conviction that I may hit someone who hits me, that I
may take back stolen property, that I may lash out with bitter words at one who has acted
cruelly towards me. The same principle supports the notion that a person is entitled, as a matter
of justice, to redress a wrong done to her.”).
286. See Robert E. Goodin, Compensation and Redistribution, in COMPENSATORY JUSTICE,
supra note 276, at 143, 143–77.
287. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-10 (2006).
288. See supra Part.III.C.2.
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payment of damages, or compensation, is to “restore[] equality,” to
use Aristotle’s term, between the two men, both of equal dignity and
289
moral worth.
290
Compensation has always been about justice. Indeed, the duty
to pay damages—compensation—is the fundamental act of “repair”
291
in corrective justice theory. And though compensation as social
insurance may implicate distributive justice—that the victims not bear
an undue burden of the costs of particular kinds of accidents—it does
not further the kind of accountability or interpersonal justice that
292
private law allows. By viewing compensation as social insurance or a
pricing mechanism, the Court furthers the notion of private law as
regulation, keeping concepts like wrongs and redress out of the
picture.
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF RECAPTURING PRIVATE LAW
We have now seen how the evolution of First Amendment
doctrine, the unitary nature of the state-action doctrine, and the
influence of instrumentalist thinking have combined to shape the
Court’s view of the role of private law. Having unpacked these
factors, the question then becomes how this ought to affect doctrine.
Here, we are cautious. Our observations in Part III on the factors that
have shaped the Court’s theory of private law are not the kind to lead
to wholesale doctrinal revamping. For the most part, our prescription
is for greater caution in determining the interests at stake when
private law is at issue.
Nonetheless, we present some prescriptive or normative ideas
here in Part IV. Our ideas come from thinking about these issues in
the First Amendment context, but some may apply more broadly to
how the Supreme Court ought to treat private law and the state
interest in providing redress or access to courts for individuals in a
variety of contexts.
289. ARISTOTLE, supra note 281, at 125–27.
290. See MILLER, supra note 277, at 4 (“[J]ustice is a matter of restoring balance, achieving
equity, determining equivalence, making reparations, paying debts, taking revenge—all matters
of getting back to zero, to even.”).
291. See COLEMAN, supra note 58, at 329–60, 437–38; WEINRIB, supra note 59, at 56–58
(describing corrective justice as a self-contained practice in which those who behave wrongfully
discharge their duty of repair by compensating those they have harmed).
292. See Jason M. Solomon, What Is Civil Justice?, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 317, 329 (2010)
(“[C]ivil justice is a legal regime that responds to wrongdoing by vindicating the right of the
victim to hold the wrongdoer accountable.”).
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The payoff of the prior discussion can be boiled down to three
prescriptive points, directed toward the Supreme Court: (1) because
private law has value that is not reducible to regulation, consider
placing further limits on the speech torts without shutting them off
entirely; (2) take a careful look at state interests, including things like
providing citizens with a right to redress; and (3) recognize that the
identity of the plaintiff matters generally and specifically in
understanding the value of the litigation at issue.
A. Tinker with Speech Torts, But Do Not Shut Them Off Entirely
In Sullivan, the Court dealt with the conflict over First
Amendment values by creating a fault requirement for the state of
mind of the defendant—“actual malice”—in order for the plaintiff to
293
recover. But there were several other roads not taken that could be
explored anew. Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion in Snyder seems to
indicate that if the First Amendment applies, then it automatically
294
trumps. There would be no liability at all. But Justice Breyer’s
approach in his concurring opinion that called for a more nuanced
assessment of First Amendment interests in light of the state interest
295
is perfectly plausible.
Moreover, in a case like Snyder, it might be that only actual
296
damages are warranted. If the concern is that verdicts like this
would put too high a price on speech, then this could serve to lower
the price considerably. In this way, an individual like Snyder could
still get redress by being able to confront in court the individual who
297
had wronged him.
Perhaps, though, one could say that no lawyer would take such a
case if there were only actual damages available, and that, therefore,
the ability to get into court at all is illusory. One might also ask: If not
a serious damages award, what would the remedy be? Here, though,

293. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
294. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (“Whether the First Amendment
prohibits holding Westboro liable for its speech in this case turns largely on whether that speech
is of public or private concern, as determined by all the circumstances of the case.”).
295. Id. at 1221–22 (Breyer, J., concurring).
296. See Epstein, supra note 123 at 793–94 (suggesting that limiting an award to actual
damages was a road that the Sullivan Court could have taken).
297. See id. at 791 (arguing that the presumption “should be in favor of the constitutional
permissibility of the common law rules”); Timothy Zick, “Duty-Defining Power” and the First
Amendment’s Civil Domain, 109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 116, 120 (2009) (pointing out that
Sullivan’s constitutionalizing of the common law was an “anomaly”).
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it may well be that the ability to demand answers and confront
298
another is a value in itself, and also alternative remedies such as
court-ordered apologies or some form of restorative justice might also
299
serve that state interest in redress just as well or better.
One thing, though, is clear: As a mechanism for providing
redress, private law is not something that is easily replicated by other
avenues, particularly in the case of private-figure plaintiffs like
Snyder. This inquiry about available redress, though, has been
entirely absent due to the Court’s imputing regulatory motive to the
300
state. Closer attention to the state interest in redress, we believe,
would lead to greater efforts to allow some measure of redress, while
still protecting First Amendment values.
B. Take a Considered Look at State Interests and State Level of
Involvement
Second, the Court ought to take a considered look at state
interests, and not automatically assume that the regulation of primary
301
activity is what the state is after. In order to do this, the court will
have to understand the common law as embodying rights of various
302
kinds, including the right to redress. And the Court will have to be
comfortable with the fact that the common law contains no purpose
303
section, as statutes passed by state legislatures frequently do.
Nonetheless, the history of the common law, the practice in states,
and the presence of rights of redress in state constitutions are all
indicia that this interest is something that matters to states.

298. Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. REV. 67,
73–74 (2010).
299. See Solomon, supra note 242, at 266–67 (“We can also think of a hypothetical civil
justice system where apologies are the most common remedy, as opposed to money damages.”).
300. See Zipursky, supra note 179, at 519 (“The question is not whether the state may
regulate or prohibit this type of speech. It is whether the state may permit accountability and
individual recovery when one person has emotionally harmed another under such
circumstances.”).
301. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, The Paradox of Balancing Significant Interests, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 825, 826 (1994) (arguing that government interests play an “immense, though often
unarticulated role in constitutional adjudication” and are not subject to the same scrutiny as
claims of constitutional rights).
302. See Goldberg, supra note 65, at 606–11 (making the case for such a right, in conjunction
with historical and doctrinal evidence).
303. See Nelson, supra note 175, at 1855 (noting that modern courts “rarely hesitate” in
considering legislative history and other information about the internal deliberations of
legislatures when inquiring into governmental purpose).
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There is also the question of how exactly to determine what the
state interest is and who to listen to on the question. In Snyder’s case,
304
he sued Phelps and the Westboro Baptist Church. All parties were
private individuals and entities. The state of Maryland was nowhere
in the picture. So when the Court was determining what the state
interest was in the underlying law, there was no one representing the
state to ask.
By the time the case got to the Supreme Court, Maryland, along
with several other states, had entered as amici. Their brief
emphasized the importance of “protecting the sanctity and privacy of
funerals,” as well as their interest in protecting “the emotional well305
being of grieving families through traditional tort law.” The state,
then, appeared to also buy into the idea of tort law as regulation. But
it is not clear how much weight ought to be given to the state’s
306
assertions in litigation. Among the unusual dimensions of placing
state interests at the center of the analysis is that it is not at all clear
307
who gets to define those interests, or how.
In determining the state interest, though, a distinct doctrinal
question—the threshold one of whether the state is sufficiently
involved to trigger constitutional scrutiny at all (under the state action
doctrine)—has the potential to mislead. As explained above, state308
action doctrine has become overly unitary. Either there is state
action, or there is not. There is no in-between. So when there is state
action, the state involvement is assumed to be regulatory. After all,
that is what modern governments do.
Many scholars have criticized the state-action doctrine, saying
309
that it is outmoded and should be retired. Our view is somewhat
different. To a certain extent, we think the public-private distinction
that the state-action doctrine helps police should be stronger, not
304. See Snyder v. Phelps, 533 F. Supp. 2d 567, 569 (D. Md. 2008), rev’d, 580 F.3d 206 (4th
Cir. 2009), aff’d, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011).
305. Brief for the state of Kansas, 47 Other States, and the District of Columbia as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 1–2, Snyder v. Phelps, 130 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (No. 09-751),
2010 WL 2224733, at *1–2.
306. See Nelson, supra note 175, at 1789 (pointing out that judicial inquiries into legislators’
“true goals” are now “widely accepted” in American constitutional doctrine).
307. See Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essential but
Unanalyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 917–18 (1988) (pointing
out that the literature has ignored the “validity of the process of inferring interests” and “the
validity of the interests inferred”).
308. See supra note 203–204 and accompanying text.
309. See Metzger, supra note 189, at 1446–47 & n.275 (2003).
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weaker. That is, we think more attention ought to be paid to the
310
genuinely private aspect of private-law actions.
The issue, though, would not be whether the Constitution is
implicated at all, as under the current unitary state-action doctrine. In
our view, the extent to which the state is involved in the litigation has
implications for the extent to which constitutional rights are at
311
stake. If the state involvement consists of making available a
common-law action and enforcing a jury verdict, then the
constitutional concerns should be less significant than those raised in
litigation involving a state statute, agency action, or direct action by
312
government officials. In short, the degree and kind of state
involvement ought to matter in determining the interests and values
that prevail in a particular case.
For example, at least seventeen states have statutes that forbid
some kinds of false campaign speech, and the lower courts are split
313
about whether such laws are constitutional. Of course, speech in
political campaigns is at the heart of First Amendment concerns, and
the fact that it is a state statute means that the level of state
involvement is relatively high compared to a tort action brought by a
private citizen like Snyder. Because the state directive comes from
legislators who have to face voters every few years, we ought to be
suspicious of the governmental motive or purpose as well, more so
than we need to be in the twice-removed-from-the-sovereign
(plaintiff brings action, jury enforces) posture of Snyder. Here, the
motive of the legislators may well be to suppress speech that is critical
of incumbents like them—much closer to the facts and posture of
Sullivan than Snyder. And so a court ought to give more First

310. Cf. Christian Turner, State Action Problems, 65 FLA. L. REV. 281, 284 (2013) (arguing
that the “morass of the state action doctrine is almost entirely a product of conflicting intuitions
concerning what is public . . . and what is private,” and also arguing for more attention, not less,
to what exactly is public and what is private about the area of law at issue).
311. For a similar argument in the context of how to deal with privatization, see id. at 1431–
32, which criticizes the “all-or-nothing” approach to state action as a “very blunt instrument.”
312. See Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 721, 730 (1931) (extending this
principle to judicial injunctions against speech in a 5–4 decision in part based on the ex post
availability of private-law remedies such as defamation); Epstein, supra note 123, at 788 & n.14
(pointing out that if one reads Blackstone, “one could easily conclude that freedom of press
meant only that prior restraint by administrative officials was unconstitutional” (citing 4
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *151)).
313. See Adam Liptak, Was That Twitter Blast False, or Just Honest Hyperbole?, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2012, at A12 (mentioning a pending certiorari petition challenging a Minnesota
law of this kind).
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Amendment protection to the defendant in such a case, relative to the
defendants in Snyder.
C. The Identity of the Plaintiff and the Purpose of the Litigation
Matter
Finally the identity of the plaintiff and the point of the litigation
ought to be taken into account. In a case like Snyder, the fact that the
plaintiff is an individual, not a state, matters. It matters because one
reason we give individuals access to the courts is to underscore their
moral and political agency. And it ought to matter for First
Amendment doctrine in a few ways.
First, the public or private status of the plaintiff ought to remain
a central part of First Amendment doctrine when evaluating the
viability of speech torts. In Snyder, the Court ignored this central
issue—whether the identity of the plaintiff ought to matter to the
314
level of First Amendment protection accorded the speech. Using
this doctrinal divide in intentional infliction of emotional distress
cases—as well as in privacy and defamation cases where it is well
established—is truer to the real interests at stake. The entitlement to
redress for a public figure ought to be less because of the decision to
315
be in the public eye.
In Snyder, the Court confronted a situation similar to that in
Hustler with one important difference: neither Al Snyder nor his dead
son was a public figure. Unlike Jerry Falwell, they had not placed
themselves before the public as participants in public affairs who can
expect bare-knuckled political debate. Al Snyder didn’t ask for the
Westboro Baptist Church to show up at his son’s funeral simply
316
because his son was a Marine. Accordingly, the state interest is

314. Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1221 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The Court
holds that the First Amendment protects the picketing that occurred here, primarily because the
picketing addressed matters of ‘public concern.’ While I agree . . . I do not believe that our First
Amendment analysis can stop at that point.”); Jeffrey Shulman, Free Speech at What Cost?:
Snyder v. Phelps and Speech-Based Tort Liability, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 313, 325–
26, 333–34 (criticizing the Fourth Circuit’s opinion and the Westboro Baptist Church lawyers for
ignoring the status of the plaintiff).
315. But see Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional
Distress Tort, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 300, 304 (arguing that the public/private figure
distinction “bears only on the degree of culpability required to allow compensatory damages for
the constitutionally valueless false statements of fact”).
316. The second and third sentences of Justice Alito’s dissent read: “Petitioner Albert
Snyder is not a public figure. He is simply a parent whose son, Marine Lance Corporal Matthew
Snyder, was killed in Iraq.” Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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stronger in providing redress against those who have wronged him by
invading his privacy and inflicting emotional pain. By failing to
recognize this dichotomy in Snyder, the Court further obscured the
centrality of the plaintiff’s agency and interest in accountability
through private law.
To be sure, this distinction has been difficult to navigate in the
defamation context, but in cases like Snyder’s—in which the plaintiff
is a private figure, not a public one—there ought to be less First
Amendment protection for the speaker. The majority opinion in
Snyder looked exclusively at the content of the speech in deciding the
amount of First Amendment protection it was given; because it was
317
held to be a matter of public concern (itself debatable), it got full
318
First Amendment protection. But the other side of the equation is
what the state’s interest is in providing redress for this plaintiff. Put
differently, the question is whether the plaintiff has the moral
authority to complain about certain speech. When the plaintiff is a
public figure of his or her own choosing, then courts in the
defamation context will frequently deny liability on the ground that
the plaintiff does not have a right to complain, having sought the
319
spotlight. But if the plaintiff is a private citizen like Snyder, then he
does have grounds to complain.
In addition, the plaintiff’s identity matters because it provides a
clue as to what the purpose of any particular lawsuit is—a key issue in
320
First Amendment doctrine. Snyder’s interest was certainly not in
speech suppression. It was in demanding accountability from
someone who had harmed him at a particularly vulnerable time in his
life. If the Supreme Court took a closer look at what was actually
going on in the underlying litigation, instead of assuming that the
plaintiff and the jury were acting as agents of state regulation, then
the degree of First Amendment protection might not have been so
absolute.

317. See id. at 1226 (“While commentary on the Catholic Church or the United States
military constitutes speech on matters of public concern, speech regarding Matthew Snyder’s
purely private conduct does not.”).
318. Id. at 1218 (majority opinion).
319. Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs, supra note 4, at 1767.
320. See supra notes 170–177 and accompanying text.
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CONCLUSION
The core of the First Amendment prevents prior restraint of
speech by government officials. That much we have known for a long
time. It is only since Sullivan in 1964 that we have grappled with what
limits exactly the First Amendment places on civil liability for speech
ex post, as opposed to criminal punishment of speech ex post or
restraint of speech ex ante.
In this Article, we have shown just how much the First
Amendment’s protections have been broadened from Sullivan, a case
involving public officials using private law to suppress criticism of
their conduct as public officials (the core of “matters of public
concern”), to Snyder, a case involving a private citizen using private
law to seek redress against a group of people who sought to hijack his
son’s funeral for their own purposes.
In our view, the disappearance of any distinction between public
law and private law is a step too far, and has led constitutional
doctrine astray. There is something missing in the view that started
with Holmes in 1897 and is dominant at the Supreme Court in 2012.
According to this approach, all areas of law are best seen through an
instrumental lens, fundamentally as ways of promoting various public
policies of the state.
In Snyder, this approach has been taken too far. It is time to
revisit ways to protect First Amendment values while also protecting
the state interest in individuals being able to redress wrongs that were
done to them. Words can wound. And when attacked, the Al Snyders
of the future ought to have a civilized means for redeeming their
honor and holding accountable those who have wronged them. Far
from being a relic of the past, the right to civil recourse is a
fundamental part of a modern society that aspires to social equality. It
is a right worthy of state interest, and a right worthy of being
preserved.

